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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2-2(4) and its Order dated January 11, 2005. (R. 2286.) 
ISSUES 
I. Whether the District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment to Defendant 
Collins International Because Collins International Owed No Duty in Tort or 
Contract to Indemnify Lowe's for the Plaintiffs' Injuries. 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness. An appellate court grants no deference to the decision of the district court and 
reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the district court. 
Smiths v. Four Corners Mental Health Center. Inc.. 2003 UT 23, ^[13, 70 P.3d 904; Wvcalis 
v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Preservation: 
This issue was preserved because the parties adequately raised the issue of whether 
Collins International owed any duties in tort or contract to Lowe's, and the district court 
ruled on the issue. (R. 729-31 (Minute Entry)); Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT 24, f 11, 44 P.3d 
742 (agreeing that issue was adequately preserved because trial court ruled on issue). 
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II. Whether the District Court Properly Denied Lowe's Motion to Amend the Grant 
of Summary Judgment to Collins International Based upon "Newly Discovered" 
Evidence Pursuant to Rule 52 or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court has broad discretion over whether to grant relief from judgment based 
on newly discovered evidence. See, e.g., Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,253 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). As a result, Lowe's motion pursuant to Rule 52 is reviewed granting 
deference to the district court. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. G. Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40,1f 5, 78 
P.3d 612. Lowe's motion pursuant to Rule 60 is also reviewed granting deference to the 
district court, reversing only for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 
228-29 (Utah 1983). 
Preservation: 
The issue of the applicability of Rule 52 was not preserved because it was never raised 
by Lowe's in the district court. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998) (explaining that for an issue to be preserved for appeal, "[the] trial court must be 
offered an opportunity to rule on [the] issue"). 
The issue of the applicability of Rule 60 was adequately preserved when it was raised 
by Lowe's in its motion to amend, and the issue was ruled on by the district court. (R. 806-
16,909-917 Lowe's briefing); R. 2273-74 (Order on motion)); Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 
T[l 1,44 P.3d 742 (agreeing that issue was adequately preserved because trial court ruled on 
issue). 
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III. Whether the District Court Correctly Dismissed Defendant Collins Co., a 
Taiwanese Corporation, for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review: 
Whether a district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant under Utah law and 
the United States Constitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State in re W. A. 
v. D.A., 2002 UT 127,TJ8, 63 P.3d 607; see also Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine 
Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) (holding that where a pretrial jurisdictional issue is 
made based upon documentary evidence or affidavits from the parties, an appeal from the 
decision is a question of law reviewed for correctness); Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, \2, 8 P.3d 256 (plurality decision stating same). 
Preservation: 
The issue of whether the district court had specific personal jurisdiction over Collins 
Co. was adequately preserved because the parties adequately raised the issue, and the district 
court ruled on the issue. (R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3 (hearing transcript)); Spears v. Warr, 2002 
UT 24, f 11, 44 P.3d 742 (agreeing that issue was adequately preserved because trial court 
ruled on issue); see also Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
The issue of whether the district court had general personal jurisdiction over Collins 
Co. was not adequately preserved. This is because Lowe's failed to argue the issue of 
general personal jurisdiction to the district court and clarified at the hearing on the motion 
that Lowe's was only alleging specific personal jurisdiction, not general personal jurisdiction. 
(R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3 (hearing transcript).); Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (explaining that for an 
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issue to be preserved for appeal, "[the] trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on 
[the] issue"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Allen Ervin sustained injury when a wheelbarrow tire he was inflating exploded in 
May 1999. Mr. Ervin purchased the wheelbarrow from Eagle Hardware & Garden ("Eagle") 
two days before. In his complaint, Mr. Ervin asserted the tire was defective, and by the time 
he filed suit in 2001, Eagle had merged with Lowe's Companies, Inc. ("Lowe's). As a 
result, Plaintiffs sued Lowe's, but not Eagle. 
As a result of the merger between Eagle and Lowe's, Lowe's was the surviving 
corporation. As the surviving corporation, Lowe's assumed Eagle's assets and liabilities. 
Eventually, Lowe's settled the Plaintiffs' claim. Before settling with the Plaintiffs, however, 
Lowe's filed a third-party complaint against Collins International, Ltd. ("Collins 
International"), a New Jersey Corporation. Lowe's erroneously believed Collins 
International had manufactured or distributed the wheelbarrow. 
Through the litigation, it was discovered that Collins International did not 
manufacture, sell, or otherwise distribute the wheelbarrow. As a result, Collins International 
owed no duties in tort to Lowe's. Lowe's also alleged in its complaint, however, that 
4 
because Collins International had agreed, through a 1996 Master Buying Agreement, to 
indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's would incur for products sold to Lowe's by Collins 
International, that this contract should somehow extend to transactions between Collins Co. 
of Taiwan and Eagle. The district court disagreed with Lowe's contention. Interpreting the 
1996 contract, the district court concluded that Collins International agreed only to indemnify 
Lowe's for products sold to Lowe's by Collins International, not for products sold to Eagle 
by Collins Co. of Taiwan at a time when Lowe's and Eagle had no relationship. Concluding 
that Lowe's had no claim in either tort or contract against Collins International, the district 
court granted Collins International summary judgment. 
Lowe's then sought additional time and permission from the district court to discover 
whether Collins International's parent corporation, Collins Co., Ltd. ("Collins Co."), a 
Taiwanese corporation, manufactured or sold the wheelbarrow; and whether the Utah court 
could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese company. Months later, Lowe's 
filed an amended third-party complaint against Collins Co. of Taiwan. In response, Collins 
Co. asserted, through a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and accompanying 
affidavit, that it had no contacts with the state of Utah; and even if it did, it did not 
manufacture or distribute the wheelbarrow. Collins Co. of Taiwan was dismissed for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. This appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Initial Procedural Posture and Discovery Deadline 
Plaintiffs Allen and Blanche Ervin claimed they were injured due to the explosion of 
an allegedly defective wheelbarrow tire in May 1999. (R. 0003-00011.) They filed a 
Complaint in May 2001 against two defendants: Lowe's Companies, Inc. ("Lowe's"), and 
Shih Fa, a Vietnamese corporation.1 (R. 0001-00011.) Plaintiffs claimed to have purchased 
the wheelbarrow from "Eagle Hardware and Garden" on May 11,1999. (R. 0003.) Plaintiffs 
note that Eagle later merged with Lowe's. (R. 0003.) 
After being sued by Plaintiffs, Lowe's filed a Third-Party Complaint against Collins 
International Co., Ltd., a New Jersey Coiporation ("Collins International"), raising issues of 
strict products liability and contractual indemnity. (R. 00029-00034.) Lowe's alleged the 
following against Collins International: (1) "Collins [International] . . . manufactured, 
distributed, marketed, or sold the [wheelbarrow and its component parts] to Lowe's or its 
predecessor [Eagle Hardware] in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition." (R. 31 
(Third-Party Compl. Tf6).) As a result, Lowe's alleged Collins International was liable 
pursuant to the doctrine of strict products liability and breach of warranty as a purported 
manufacturer or seller. (R. 31 (Third-Parly Compl. \l (a), (b), & (d).) Lowe's also alleged 
that Collins International owed a contractual duty "to indemnify Lowe's." (R. 1680 (Third-
1
 Defendant Shih Fa was later dismissed on January 24, 2002. (R. 82-84 
(Stipulated Mot. for Dismissal of Shih Fa), R. 85-86 (Order of Dismissal of Shih Fa).) As 
a result, the only parties to the litigation at that time were Plaintiffs, Lowe's, and Collins 
International. 
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Party Compl. %l (c) & (e).) At this time Lowe's only sought indemnity from Collins 
International, the New Jersey Corporation, and it did not file a claim against Collins Co., Ltd, 
a Taiwanese Corporation. 
The Ervins, Lowe's, and Collins International proceeded with discovery. Lowe's 
sought discovery from Collins International, serving interrogatories, requests for production 
of documents, and requests for admissions inMarch2002. (R. 00103-05.) Likewise, Collins 
International served on Lowe's interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and 
requests for admission in March 2002. (R. 00113-115 (Certificate of Delivery of 
Discovery).) Collins International responded to Lowe's discovery requests in April 2002. 
Lowe's answered Collins International's requests for admissions in April 2002, but Lowe's 
did not respond to Collin International's interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents. (R. 00120-21.) 
In May 2002, the district court ordered Lowe's to respond to all outstanding discovery 
on or before July 20, 2002. (R. 236-37.) Lowe's responded to the interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, but had no evidence that Collins International 
manufactured, distributed, marketed, or sold the wheelbarrow. (R. 0248-49 (certificate of 
Delivery of Discovery); R. 00259-00262 (repeating Lowe's responses to Interrogatories 
verbatim in motion for summary judgment.) Lowe's also had no evidence that Collins 
International owed Lowe's any duty to indemnify it for the Plaintiffs' damages. (Id.) 
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B. Collins International's Motion for Summary Judgment 
As a result of this lack of evidence, Collins International filed a motion for summary 
judgment in August 2002. (R. 00253-55.) Collins International argued two points: (1) there 
was no evidence that Collins International manufactured, sold, or otherwise distributed the 
wheelbarrow; and (2) Collins International owed no duty to indemnify Lowe's for the 
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. (R. 00256-72.) Collins International pointed out that Lowe's 
failed to provide through discovery any evidence that Collins International manufactured, 
distributed, marketed, or sold the wheelbarrow. (R. 00259-00262; see also R. 00263 TflO; 
00266-68.) Collins International also pointed out that Lowe's failed to produce through 
discovery any evidence that Collins International owed Lowe's a duty to indemnify it for the 
Plaintiffs' damages. (R. 00260.)2 
Lowe's filed an opposition memorandum in September 2002. Lowe's did not, 
however, file a motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) claiming it needed 
further discovery.3 Instead, Lowe's argued Collins International owed a duty to indemnify 
Lowe's for the Plaintiffs' damages and litigation expenses. (R. 00448-49.) In making this 
argument, Lowe's introduced evidence that was never produced through discovery before 
2
 Collins International also asserted that Lowe's was not entitled to common law 
equitable indemnification because of the Utah Liability Reform Act. (R. 00265, 00269-
70.) 
3
 Rule 56(f) allows a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file an 
affidavit stating reasons why the party is presently unable to submit evidence in 
opposition to the moving party's motion Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2005); Crossland Sav. v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). Instead of seeking additional discovery 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), Lowe's opposed the motion. 
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the July 20, 2002 deadline. (R. 00448-00671.) This requested but never-before-disclosed 
discovery included an October 1996 contract between Lowe's and Collins International, (R. 
00520-37; October 1996 Master Standard Buying Agreement, attached as Addendum C), and 
a September 2000 contract between a subsidiary of Lowe's and Collins Co. of Taiwan.4 (R. 
00492-519.) 
Because Lowe's failed to comply with the district court's July 20,2002 deadline for 
discovery, Collins International moved to strike Lowe's untimely materials.5 (R. 00678-80.) 
In its reply brief to the motion for summary judgment, Collins International advised Lowe's 
and the district court that Lowe's named the wrong company, and reiterated that Collins 
International had no involvement in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of the 
wheelbarrow. (R. 00681-688.) In addition to filing the motion to strike Lowe's untimely 
materials, Collins International also pointed out that the agreement upon which Lowe's relied 
for indemnity applied only to products sold by Collins International to Lowe's, and the wheel 
barrow was not such a product. (R. 00686.) 
After oral argument, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Collins 
International. (R. 00689 (hearing); R. 00729-00732 (Minute Entry granting Summ. J.).) In 
4
 Lowe's attached more than two hundred pages of materials as exhibits without 
explaining their applicability. (R. 00439-455 (body of opposition memorandum), R. 
00456-00671 (numerous unexplained materials).) Lowe's asserted that Collins 
International should indemnify Lowe's and "cut and pasted" quotations from statutes and 
cases, but failed to explain their applicability or provide any reasoned analysis why the 
newly produced documents imposed a duty on Collins International to indemnify Lowe's. 
(R. 00448-52.) 
5
 The district court never ruled on this motion to strike. 
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granting summary judgment, the district court stated that "[t]he undisputed facts established] 
the following: (1) Lowe's and Collins International entered into a contract in October 1996; 
(2) in the contract, Collins International and its subsidiaries agreed to indemnify Lowe's; (3) 
one of Collins International's subsidiaries sold a wheel barrow to Eagle Hardware and 
Garden, Inc.; (4) Eagle Hardware and Garden and Lowe's merged in July 2000.6 (R. 00729-
30.) After listing these findings, the court explained that Collins International owed no 
contractual duties to Lowe's for Plaintiffs' injuries, injuries arising from the sale of a product 
to Eagle before Eagle and Lowe's merged. This was because the October 1996 contract that 
Lowe's claimed provided indemnification was between Collins International and Lowe's; 
but the wheelbarrow was sold to Eagle, not Lowe's. The district court concluded, "At the 
time the wheelbarrow was sold and the injury occurred, Eagle and Lowe's had no 
relationship." (R. 00730.) In other words, Eagle was liable for the Plaintiffs' injuries 
because the purchase of the wheelbarrow and accident occurred before the merger. Collins 
International was only liable to Lowe's from claims against Lowe's arising from products 
sold by Collins International to Lowe's, not for sales to Eagle. (R. 00730.) The district court 
also held that Collins International owed no duty in tort or "common law claims" because 
"there is no evidence to indicate that Collins International did anything to manufacture, sell 
or in any way handle the product at issue." (R. 00730.) 
6
 The September 2000 contract was irrelevant and not mentioned by the district 
court. Collins International was not a party to the September 2000 contract. The 
September 2000 contract was between LGS, a Lowe's subsidiary, and Collins Co. of 
Taiwan, who was not a party to the lawsuit. 
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C. Lowe's Chance for Further Discovery to Determine the Proper Defendant 
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Collins International, 
Lowe's sought to have the order amended.7 (R. 00802-00805 (Motion to Am. J.); R. 00806-
816 (Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Am. J.).) Collins International opposed the request. (R. 
00867-73.) Lowe's noticed the motion to amend for decision, (R. 00906), but then filed a 
reply memorandum three days later. (R. 00909.) In Lowe's belated reply memorandum, 
Lowe's argued that the motion to amend the order granting summary judgment should be 
granted based upon more "new evidence" and the need for more discovery. (R. 00913-17.) 
Again, there was no mention of Rule 56(f) by Lowe's. 
The district court scheduled a hearing to address, among other things, Lowe's motion 
to amend the order granting summary judgment. (R. 00969.) At the hearing, the district 
court did not expressly rule on the motion to amend, but as stated in its Minute Entry, ruled 
in favor of Lowe's, suspending the operation of the summary judgment in favor of Collins 
International. (R. 01128-29.) In its signed Order, dated January 17,2003, the district court 
ruled in favor of Lowe's, ordering that Collins International would "remain a party . . . for 
the purpose of submitting to further discovery by Lowe's." (R. 01148-51.) This additional 
discovery was limited, however, to specific issues involving agreements for insurance or 
indemnification and corporate structure and relationships among the Collins group of 
7
 Lowe's referenced certain rules as grounds for the motion, but again offered no 
meaningful argument or analysis on this point. In its Memorandum, Lowe's "cut and 
pasted" portions of Rules 62, 60, and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and then 
claimed that the summary judgment order should be revised. (R. 00812-13.) No analysis 
or legal argument on how the rules applied to the case were presented. (R. 00812-13.) 
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companies. (R. 01149.) The purpose of this additional discovery was to permit Lowe's to 
discover whether any entities affiliated with Collins International were manufacturers or 
distributors of the wheelbarrow and were viable defendants. (R. 01148-51.) 
D. Lowe's Amended Complaint Against Collins Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese 
Corporation, but Not Against Collins International, Ltd., the New Jersey 
Corporation 
After more than three months of permitted additional discovery, on May 6, 2003, 
Lowe's filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint against Collins Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese 
corporation, (R. 1678-83), and Collins Co. was served with a copy of the summons and 
complaint in Taipei City, Taiwan. (R. 01369-16408 (March 24); R. 1737-38 (May 9).) 
Lowe's failed to name Collins International, the New Jersey Corporation, as a defendant, 
apparently dropping its suit against Collins International. (R. 01678-83.) 
Lowe's allegations against Collins Co. are nearly identical to those previously alleged 
against Collins International. They include the following: (1) "Collins [Co.] . . . 
manufactured distributed, marketed, or sold the [wheelbarrow and its component parts] to 
Lowe's or its predecessor Eagle Hardware in a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
condition." (R. 1680 (Am. Third-Party Compl. ^ [6).) Lowe's alleged Collins Co. washable 
to Lowe's pursuant to the doctrine of strict products liability and breach of warranty as a 
purported manufacturer or seller. (R. 1680 (Am. Third-Party Compl. \J (a), (b), & (d).) 
8
 Apparently a clerical error occurred in numbering the record. The record 
erroneously numbers the pages of the summons and complaint served on Collins Co., 
Ltd., the Taiwanese corporation, as follows: 1367, 1368, 1369, 1640. The record then 
continues its numbering with 1641. 
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Lowe's also alleged that Collins Co. owed contractual duties to Lowe's "to obtain insurance 
covering Lowe's" and "to indemnify Lowe's." (R. 1680 (Am. Third-Party Compl. \1 (c) & 
(e).)9 
E. Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment in Favor of Collins 
International 
Approximately three weeks after filing its Amended Third Party Complaint against 
Collins Co. of Taiwan, Lowe's also filed a motion for relief from the order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Collins International.10 (R. 01751-53 (Mot. For Relief from Summ. J.); 
R. 01754-01759 (Mem. Supp. Mot. For Relief from Summ. J.).) Lowe's asserted newly 
discovered evidence. In making this motion, Lowe's admitted that it was "cognizant that the 
grounds on which it relie[d] include[d] recent production of its own internal documents." 
9
 As is explained in detail below, Collins Co. did not contest Lowe's assertions 
that Collins Co. sold the wheelbarrow to Eagle. Instead, Collins Co. simply appeared 
specially to challenge jurisdiction. Notwithstanding, as established in the Affidavit of 
Mr. Nelson Shen in support of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
Collins Co. of Taiwan's "only connection with Eagle Hardware regarding wheelbarrows 
was to refer Eagle Hardware to a manufacturer of wheelbarrows." (R. 2012, Yh 4, 7.) "At 
no time did Collins International in Taipei, Taiwan, manufacture, inspect, possess, ship, 
or receive for shipment any component part or assembled wheelbarrow for sale to Eagle 
Hardware or any other retail outlet." (R. 2012, ffl[ 4, 7.) 
10
 On June 19, 2003, a Default Certificate was issued against Collins Co., Ltd. (R. 
01983-84.) This default certificate was set aside, however, by stipulation in open court. 
The transcript reads as follows: 
THE COURT: That's right. So for the record then, the stipulation is that Collins 
will waive any defects in service and Lowe's will agree that the 
default certificate can be set aside. Right? 
MR. ZACCHEO (counsel for Collins): That's correct. 
MR. ROSS (counsel for Lowe's): That's correct. 
(R. 2190 at 2:17-22.) 
13 
(R. 01758.)11 Collins International opposed the motion. (R. 01951-56.) In its opposition, 
Collins International pointed out that the merger of Lowe's and Eagle Hardware & Garden 
did not take effect until July 27,2000, more than a year after the wheelbarrow accident. (R. 
1952-53.) Collins International argues that because Eagle was not a subsidiary of Lowe's 
when Lowe's entered into the agreement with Collins International, Collins International 
owed no duty to indemnify Lowe's for an injury suffered by purchasers of an Eagle product. 
(R. 01953.) Collins International also argued that Lowe's was not enlitled to relief from the 
judgment because relief may only be granted if the newly discovered evidence could not have 
been discovered by due diligence, and Lowe's had more than two years to discover the newly 
discovered evidence, but failed to exercise due diligence to do so. (PL 01954.) Indeed, the 
"newly discovered evidence" was Lowe's own internal documents. 
On June 19, 2003, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Collins 
International. (R. 01980-82.) The district court explained that Collins International had 
remained in the case for Lowe's to conduct additional discovery regarding the relationship 
of the Collins companies, and the additional discovery had been completed. (R. 01981.) 
Lowe's had been given sufficient time and access to Collins International's documents to 
determine whether or not an affiliate of Collins International manufactured or distributed the 
11
 Lowe's again failed to adequately brief this motion. Instead of developing legal 
authority and providing reasoned analysis, Lowe's provided extensive block quotes and 
failed to provide any meaningful analysis. (R. 01754-59.) As can best be discerned, 
Lowe's argued that recently discovered internal documents regarding the merger between 
Lowe's and Eagle somehow warranted relief from summary judgment. (R. 01755-57.) 
14 
wheelbarrow. As a result of its investigation, Lowe's filed an Amended Third-Party 
complaint against Collins Co. 
In ruling on Lowe's motion to amend the judgment, the district court did not mention 
that the "newly discovered" evidence that consisted of Lowe's own internal documents was 
improper, but instead simply stated that the "new evidence" did not change the district 
court's ruling. The district court concluded that, for the reasons given in its September 30, 
2002 Minute Entry, Collins International was still entitled to summary judgment. (R. 01981.) 
F. In Lowe's Own Motion for Summary Judgment, Lowe's Tacitly Admits 
it Never Purchased the Wheelbarrow in Question from Collins 
International or Collins Co. 
On May 23,2003, Lowe's filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of 
all of the Ervins' causes of action against it. (R. 01897-99.) In its memorandum in support 
of the motion, Lowe's asserted the following as undisputed facts: (1) Plaintiffs bought the 
wheelbarrow from Eagle, not Lowe's, on May 11, 1999, (R. 01901); (2) Lowe's and Eagle 
entered into a merger agreement on November 22,1998 (R. 01902); (3) Lowe's "has not sold 
any product or merchandise in Utah; [or] shipped any product or merchandise to or from 
Utah . . . " (R. 01903-04); and (4) Lowe's "did not sell or distribute the subject product." (R. 
1904) (emphasis added.) 
The Ervins and Lowe's settled their dispute in June 2003. (R. 1968-73 (Release of 
Claims by Plaintiffs).) As a result, Plaintiffs dismissed their claims. (R. 1962-64 (Stip. and 
Joint Mot. to Dismiss Pis.' Claims), R. 1965-67 (Order of Dismissal of Pis.' Claims).) 
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G. Collins Co. of Taiwan's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Collins Co. of Taiwan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in 
July 2003. (R. 1985-87 (Mot. Dismiss for Lack of Pers. Jurisd.); R. 1988-2002 (Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Dismiss for Lack of Pers. Jurisd.).)12 In the motion, Collins Co. pointed out, among 
other things, that it had no contacts with the state of Utah. Based upon the Affidavit of 
Nelson Shen, the manager of the Taipei, Taiwan office for Collins Co., Collins Co. listed 
various supporting facts demonstrating its complete lack of contact with the state of Utah. 
Mr. Shen by affidavit established the following facts that were never disputed: Collins Co. 
does not manufacture goods and did not manufacture the wheelbarrow at issue; Collins Co. 
did not inspect, possess, ship or receive any component part or assembled part for sale, much 
less the wheelbarrow or its component parts; Collins Co. had no contacts within the state of 
Utah; Collins Co. conducted no advertising in the state of Utah; Collins Co. conducted no 
business in the state of Utah; Collins Co. did not contract to supply goods or services in the 
state of Utah. (R. 1999-2002 (unsigned Aff. of Nelson Shen); R. 2011-14 (original signed 
12
 The caption of the Motion to Dismiss mistakenly identified the movant as 
Collins International of New Jersey. The body of the motion, however, properly and 
clearly identified the movant as the Taiwanese company Collins Co. (R. 1985-87 (Mot. 
Dismiss for Lack of Pers. Jurisd.); R. 1988-2002 (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss for Lack of 
Pers. Jurisd.). 
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Aff. of Nelson Shen).) Based upon the foregoing, Collins Co. asserted that the district court 
lacked general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. (R. 1991.) 
In opposition, Lowe's argued several bases for specific personal jurisdiction, none of 
which have foundation in the law. For example, Lowe's indicated that Collins Co. did 
business worldwide, including the United States, and reasoned that because Collins Co. did 
some business in the United States, it had to be subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts. (R. 
2016-23.) Lowe's also alleged Collins Co. attended trade shows in Chicago and conducted 
business operations in the United States, specifically the state of Washington; but Lowe's 
never identified any activities of Collins Co. in Utah. (R. 2016-23.) Additionally, Lowe's 
provided four pages of block quotations and then made the assertion that because Collins 
International, the New Jersey Company was subject to personal jurisdiction, Collins Co. 
should also be subject to personal jurisdiction. (R. 2023-28.) Lowe's also claimed Collins 
Co. should be subject to jurisdiction of Utah courts because it "was aware that the substantial 
volume [of] products it sold to Eagle would be distributed through retail stores across the 
United States." (R. 2028.) Lowe's even argued that jurisdiction over Collins Co. was proper 
in Utah because a contract between subsidiary Collins International and Lowe's contained 
a forum selection clause agreeing to North Carolina as a forum for resolving disputes 
13
 Mr. Shen's affidavit established that Collins Co. of Taiwan's "only connection 
with Eagle Hardware regarding wheelbarrows was to refer Eagle Hardware to a 
manufacturer of wheelbarrows." (R. 2012, fflf 4, 7.) "At no time did Collins International 
[sic] in Taipei, Taiwan, manufacture, inspect, possess, ship, or receive for shipment any 
component part or assembled wheelbarrow for sale to Eagle Hardware or any other retail 
outlet." (R. 2012,m[ 4, 7.) 
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between Collins International (not Collins Co.) and Lowe's. (R. 2029-31.) Finally, Lowe's 
asserted that personal jurisdiction was proper in Utah because "Utah is a more convenient 
forum for Collins than North Carolina. Utah is closer to Taiwan." (R. 2031.) 
In reply, Collins Co. refocused the district court on the pertinent legal factors: (1) 
personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. did not exist in Utah because the alleged acts did not 
invoke the Utah long-arm statute, (R. 2154-55)14; (2) jurisdiction over Collins Co. in Utah 
would offend due process, (R. 2155b-56); and (3) the North Carolina forum selection clause 
is a "puzzling" argument for jurisdiction in Utah that "should be ignored." (R. 2156.) 
The motion to dismiss was heard in October 2004. (R. 2190 (Transcript of Hearing).) 
At the hearing, counsel for Lowe's clarified that Lowe's was only alleging specific personal 
jurisdiction, not general personal jurisdiction.15 (R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3.) Lowe's also stated 
14
 The record is mismarked, and the four pertinent pages are the following 
sequential pages: R. 2154a, 2155a, 2154b, 2155b. 
15
 The colloquy between counsel for Lowe's and the district court reads as 
follows: 
MR. ROSS: (counsel for Lowe's): Thank you your honor. Do you have some 
burning questions I could speak to before I just start my 
discussion? 
THE COURT: Well, actually, just to clarify, I think - tell me if I'm wrong - that 
you're only arguing the specific personal jurisdiction, not the 
general jurisdiction which - and I don't remember the language 
of the cases-
MR. ROSS: No, you're using the right terms. 
THE COURT: led us to believe that you know, they were doing lots of business 
here and you know, continuous contact and so forth. 
MR. ROSS: Yes, in this sense, it isn't just the one specific wheelbarrow that 
we're focusing on for jurisdiction. It's kind of the home and 
garden business in general that Collins was doing with Eagle and 
(continued...) 
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at the hearing that the court need not look to the stream of commerce theory for specific 
personal jurisdiction. (R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3.) 
In an October 2003 Minute Entry, the district court granted Collins Co.'s motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 2168-71.) The district court noted that the 
parties agreed that Collins Co. lacks sufficient contacts in Utah to confer general personal 
jurisdiction. (R. 2169.) Then, in addressing the issue of specific personal jurisdiction, the 
district court explained that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. under 
either the Utah long arm statute or due process. (R. 2169-71.) Collins Co. was dismissed 
in January 2004. (R. 2178-79.) 
H. District Court Ruling on Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment and 
Eventual Appellate Jurisdiction 
On February 12,2004, Lowe's filed a premature notice of appeal. (R. 2180-82.) The 
appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because, among other things, the 
district court never ruled on Lowe's motion for relief from summary judgment. (R. 2193-
94.) As a result, the matter was remanded to the district court, and the district court ruled on 
the motion. The district court denied Lowe's motion for relief from summary judgment, first 
15(...continued) 
later with Lowe's and also a buyer's agreement. I don't know 
that those get into the area of general jurisdiction under the long 
arm statute as opposed to specific. So with those remarks, I 
would answer we're focusing on the specific. 
THE COURT: So I don't need to look at the other stream of commerce issues? 
MR. ROSS: No, I don't think ours rises to that level. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
(R. 2190: 8:5 to 9:3.) 
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noting that the motion was not ruled on because Lowe's had not submitted it for decision, 
and then explaining that Lowe's motion pursuant to Rule 52 was denied because Lowe's 
evidence did not alter the prior ruling granting summary judgment, and that Lowe's motion 
pursuant to Rule 60 was denied as untimely. (R. 2273-75.) 
Lowe's then filed a notice of appeal in January 2005, and the matter is now properly 
before this court pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). (R. 2276 (Notice of Appeal 
dated January 3, 2005); Final Judgment dated February 8, 2005, Addendum A; Notice of 
Appeal dated February 16, 2005, Addendum B; R. 2286 (Order from Utah Supreme Court 
transferring case to this Court.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First and foremost, this Court may properly dismiss Lowe's appeal for failure to 
comply with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). Utah appellate courts are not "ca 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" 
State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations omitted.) Lowe's has 
failed to properly brief each of the three issues it raised, and Appellees submit this Court may 
disregard Lowe's argument on each issue based upon the "no dumping" rule. 
As to the issues presented on summary judgment below, the district court correctly 
granted summary judgment to Collins International because Collins International owed no 
duties to Lowe's in tort or contract. Collins International did not manufacture or distribute 
the product and therefore cannot owe any duties in tort. Moreover, Collins International did 
not agree to indemnify Lowe's for products sold to Eagle long before Lowe's and Eagle 
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merged. Collins International did not agree to indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's 
incurred by merger years after signing the indemnity agreement-liabilities owed by Eagle 
for products sold by Eagle. Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's for products 
Collins International sold to Lowe's, and the product at issue was not sold to Lowe's; it was 
sold to Eagle. 
Regarding the motion to amend the order granting summary judgment to Collins 
International, this district court did not abuse its discretion. Lowe's did not produce any 
newly discovered evidence that could not have previously been discovered through due 
diligence. Instead, Lowe's presented its own internal documents that it had failed to timely 
disclose. Moreover, Lowe's own documents did not change the analysis by which Collins 
International was granted summary judgment. 
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Collins Co. of Taiwan for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to the undisputed affidavit accompanying the motion, Collins 
Co. had no contacts with the state of Utah whatsoever. This alone justified dismissal. 
Additionally, Lowe's waived any argument regarding general personal jurisdiction, and 
Lowe's purported reasons for specific personal jurisdiction have no basis in the law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment because Collins 
International Owed No Duties to Lowe's in Tort or Contract; Collins 
International did Not Manufacture or Distribute the Product, nor did Collins 
International agree to Indemnify Lowe's for Products Sold to Eagle, Liabilities 
Lowe's Later Acquired from Eagle by Merger 
A. Lowe's Failed to Adequately Brief its Challenge to the Granting of 
Summary Judgment 
It is well established that Utah appellate courts do not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed. State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d299,304-05 (Utah 1998) (citing cases for the 
proposition that issues which lack legal analysis and authority in support are properly rejected 
by appellate courts). An argument is adequately briefed if it contains "the contentions and 
reasons of the [briefing party] with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(2005). In 
other words, Rule 24(a)(9) requires citation to legal authority, development of that legal 
authority, and reasoned analysis based on that authority. If an argument fails to do this, it is 
properly rejected. Id. This is because Utah appellate courts are not 6"a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" Thomas, 961 P.2d at 
305 (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d439,450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl 
416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111 Ct. Apps. 1981))). 
Applying the "no dumping" rule to Lowe's brief on this issue of whether Collins 
International was properly awarded summary judgment, this Court may properly reject 
Lowe's argument. Lowe's brief contains five pages of argument that fail to develop legal 
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authority or explain its applicability. Four of those pages consist of mostly block quotes from 
Utah cases, an inapplicable indemnity provision, and statutory law from the State of 
Washington. However, Lowe's never develops this legal authority in any meaningful way. 
As a result, once Lowe's eventually "[t]urn[s] now to the case at hand," it is difficult to 
decipher how Lowe's contends the law applies. (Br. of Appellant at pp.15-19.) 
In addition to failing to develop legal authority, Lowe's also fails to provide any 
meaningful analysis or application of authority to the facts and circumstances of the case. 
For example, Lowe's asserts that the district court should have made a "reasonable inference 
from the evidence." (Br. of Appellant at p. 19.) Such a statement misconstrues the role of 
a district court on summary judgment. Lowe's also asserts that Eagle passed its liabilities to 
Lowe's. Lowe's fails, however, to make any connection on how this passing of liabilities 
from Eagle to Lowe's applies to Collins International. Lowe's also suggests "Collins New 
Jersey [should be liable] under the contract" because, Lowe's claims, "the wheelbarrow was 
among goods procured and shipped by the Collins Taiwan parent." This statement has no 
support in the law, and Lowe's offers no explanation of how it reaches this conclusion. 
Moreover, this statement also has no basis in fact because the undisputed record evidence is 
that Collins Co. did not sell the wheelbarrow to Lowe's, and it never manufactured or 
shipped the subject wheelbarrow or any of its component parts. Lowe's has "dumped the 
burden of argument and research." For this reason alone, Lowe's argument on the award of 
summary judgment is properly rejected. 
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B. Collins International Owes No Liability in Tort Because Collins 
International Did Not Manufacture or Sell the Wheelbarrow 
Collins International cannot be liable in tort based on strict products liability or breach 
of warranty because it did not manufacture or distribute the wheelbarrow. See Ernest W. 
Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A (1965)). The district court expressly found that "there is no evidence to 
indicate that Collins International did anything to manufacture, sell or in any way handle the 
product at issue." (R. 00730.) 
C. Collins International Cannot Be Required to Indemnify Lowe's Because 
Collins International Only Agreed to Indemnify Lowe's for Products 
Lowe's Purchased from Collins International, Not Liabilities Lowe's 
Incurred by Contract from Eagle for a Defective Eagle Product 
Lowe's request for indemnity fails because the 1996 contract requires Collins 
International to indemnify Lowe's only for products that Collins International sold to 
Lowe's, and the product at issue was not sold to Lowe's; it was sold to Eagle. Lowe's 
argument for indemnification assumes that Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's 
for products Collins International did not sell to Lowe's. (Br.of Appellant at p. 15-20.) 
Lowe's assertion is that Collins International must indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's 
purchased in a merger with Eagle years after the 1996 contract was entered into. There is no 
basis in either the contract or the law for Lowe's assertion. 
1. Interpretation of the October 1996 Contract 
The 1996 contract is clear that Collins International did not agree to indemnify Lowe's 
for a product Lowe's did not purchase. Collins International did not agree to indemnify 
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Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's would later incur by merger-liabilities owed by Eagle for 
products sold by Eagle. Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's for products 
Collins International sold to Lowe's, and the product at issue was not sold to Lowe's. The 
product was sold to Eagle, a company with whom Lowe's had no legal relationship until 
years after the 1996 contract was agreed to. 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling, and one must 
look first to the language of the agreement to determine the parties' intentions. Central Fla. 
Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, TJ12, 40 P.3d 599; Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). If the contractual language is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a 
matter of law. Central Fla. Invs.. 2002 UT 3 at [^12, 40 P.3d 599; Buehner Block Co.. 752 
P.2d at 895. In evaluating the plain language, "it is axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms 
should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Buehner Block Co.. 752 P.2d at 895. 
Additionally, the parties to a contract must reach a meeting of the minds, and the existence 
of a meeting of the minds is found in the contractual language. Oberhansley v. Earle. 572 
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (explaining the basic principle of contract law that there can 
be no contract without a meeting of the minds, and that this meeting of the minds or 
intentions of the parties is found in the language of the contract itself). 
To interpret the contract as Lowe's suggests, in favor of indemnifying Lowe's for 
products Collins International did not sell to Lowe's, but for products sold by another entity 
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to Eagle, would disregard plain language of the contract. There is no language in the contract 
to suggest Lowe's and Collins International had a meeting of the minds that Collins 
International would indemnify Lowe's for products liability claims of another company that 
Lowe's would later acquire by merger. First, the consideration for the agreement is "any and 
all purchases . . . made by Lowe's from Vendor [Collins International]." The consideration 
of the agreement is not purchases made by Eagle. Second, the contract language identifies 
indemnification for only Lowe's Companies and subsidiaries at the time of contracting, and 
Eagle was not a Lowe's subsidiary or affiliate at the time of contracting. It reads: "[Collins 
International] agrees and shall indemnify LOWE'S, "LOWE'S" means collectively LOWE'S 
COMPANIES, ONC, its subsidiaries and affiliates, including but not limited to LOWE'S 
COMPANIES, INC, LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC, THE CONTRACTOR YARD, 
INC, and all employees officers, directors and agents of LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC, 
LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC, THE CONTRACTOR YARD, INC, and their 
subsidiaries and affiliates." (R. 0528.) The contract was entered into in October 1996, and 
the merger between Eagle and Lowe's did not take effect until 2000. Harmonizing all the 
terms of the contract, it is obvious that Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's for 
products liability based upon products sold to Lowe's by Collins International. Collins 
International did not agree to indemnify Lowe's for products sold to Eagle. Collins 
International especially did not agree to indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's would later 
incur by merger—liabilities incurred by Eagle for products sold by Eagle. 
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Moreover, it is a tortured and unreasonable interpretation of the contract for Collins 
International to be required to indemnify Lowe's for injuries caused by products sold to 
Eagle. Contracts must be interpreted with reason and common sense. See Utah State Med. 
Assfn v. Utah State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643,646 (Utah 1982) (explaining that 
contracts must be interpreted according to the reasonable intentions and expectations of the 
parties, evaluating the agreement as a whole and the circumstances, nature, and purpose of 
the contract); Plain City Insurer. Co. v. Hooper Insurer. Co., 356 P.2d 625,628 (Utah 1960) 
(explaining that an unreasonable interpretation of a contract will be adopted only where the 
contract unequivocally so provides). The 1996 contract is a "Master Standard Buying 
Agreement" that governs purchases by Lowe's of Collins International products, not a 
general indemnity agreement for future liabilities Lowe's may acquire by merger. The 1996 
contract cannot reasonably be read to require Collins International to indemnify Lowe's for 
any and all injuries caused by products sold to Eagle, a company that Lowe's acquired after 
signing the 1996 contract, and after Mr. Ervin's accident. Such a reading would require 
Collins International to indemnify Lowe's for any and all products liability lawsuits filed 
against any other unknown entity that Lowe's acquires in the future by merger. Such an 
interpretation is contrary to common sense and the reasonable expectations of the parties.16 
16
 The district court expressed "trouble" with Lowe's interpretation of the 1996 
contract, and asked Lowe's to explain its reasoning that Lowe's should be indemnified 
for any and all of its liabilities. Lowe's failed to provide any support for its position at 
oral argument. (R.2189:13:16 to 16:18.) Instead, Collins International pointed out that 
there is nothing in the 1996 contract that says Collins International agreed to indemnify 
Lowe's for products sold to Lowe's by anyone other than Collins International. (R. 
(continued...) 
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In sum, harmonizing the terms of the 1996 contract and reading it in light of common 
sense and the reasonable expectations of the parties, Collins International did not agree to 
indemnify Lowe's for liabilities owed by Eagle for products sold by Eagle, liabilities Lowe's 
would later incur by merger. Collins International only agreed to indemnify Lowe's for 
products it sold to Lowe's, and the product at issue was sold to Eagle, not Lowe's. 
2. Lowe's has No Legal Authority for the Proposition that Collins 
International Should Indemnify Lowe's for Liabilities Lowe's 
Incurred by Merger Years After Entering into the 1996 Contract 
Lowe's cites no authority that would require Collins International to indemnify 
Lowe's for liabilities that Lowe's assumed by contract. The Plaintiffs were injured by a 
wheelbarrow they purchased from Eagle in 1999. Any liability for the Plaintiffs' claim was 
owed by Eagle. Eagle then merged with Lowe's, effective July 2000. By virtue of the 
merger, Lowe's acquired Eagle's liability to the Plaintiff. However, just because Lowe's 
acquired Eagle's liability to the Plaintiffs does not implicate Collins International. Collins 
International did not agree to indemnify Lowe's for any liabilities Lowe's would acquire by 
merger. The event which Collins International and Lowe's intended would trigger Collins' 
indemnification obligation is the selling of a product to Lowe's. This "trigger" cannot be 
altered or transformed by Lowe's unilateral decision to merge with Eagle. There is no 
authority for such a result in either the 1996 contract or at law. 
16(...continued) 
2189:16:21 to 19:3.) 
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D. Lowe's Argument Based Upon the Liability of Successor Corporations 
Makes No Sense and Has No Basis at Law 
Lowe's focuses on the fact that, by virtue of its merger with Eagle, it assumed the 
liabilities of Eagle. (Br. of Appellant at pp. 19-20.) However, the fact that Lowe's 
contractually assumed Eagle's liabilities does not, a fortiori, mean that Collins International 
must indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's assumed by contract, especially when Collins 
International did not sell the defective product to Lowe's. Just because Lowe's assumed 
Eagle's liabilities does not mean that Collins International is liable for anything. All it means 
is that Lowe's assumed Eagle's liabilities. 
The legal authority cited by Lowe's says nothing about Collins International's 
obligations. Lowe's cites to Washington statutory law and Utah cases for the proposition that 
Lowe's assumed Eagle's liabilities. (Br. of Appellant at p. 19.) While never expressly stated, 
Lowe's necessarily implies that it assumed Eagle's liability to the Plaintiffs. Collins 
International does not dispute Lowe's acquisition of Eagle's liability. Instead, Collins 
International asserts that the relationship between Lowe's and Eagle is immaterial to Collins 
International's duties and obligations, and therefore immaterial to this appeal. Any 
agreements or disputes between Lowe's and Eagle is properly resolved between them. The 
relationship between Lowe's and Eagle is immaterial to the contractual duties or obligations 
of Collins International arising from a contract it entered with Lowe's. The merger between 
Lowe's and Eagle had no legal effect on the liabilities or obligations of Collins International. 
29 
The only result of the merger for Collins International was only that the entity to whom it 
owed duties and obligations, Lowe's, merged with another entity. 
In sum, there is no support in the 1996 contract or the law that Collins International 
agreed to indemnify Lowe's for products sold to Eagle. There is nothing in the contract or 
the law to suggest that Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's for liabilities 
Lowe's incurred by merger years after signing the indemnity agreement—liabilities owed by 
Eagle for products sold by Eagle, and after the relevant injury of Mr. Ervin. 
II. The District Court did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Lowe's Motion to 
Amend the Order Granting Summary Judgment 
A. Lowe's Failed to Adequately Brief Issue of Proposed Relief from 
Summary Judgment 
This issue is also properly disregarded as inadequately briefed. Again, Utah appellate 
courts do not address arguments that are not adequately briefed. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-
05. An adequately briefed argument contains "the contentions and reasons of the [briefing 
party] with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(2005). If an argument fails to cite 
legal authority, develop that legal authority, and provide reasoned analysis based on that 
authority, it is properly rejected. Id. Utah appellate courts are not a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 
(internal quotations omitted.) 
Applying the "no dumping" rule to Lowe's brief on this issue, this Court may properly 
reject Lowe's argument. Lowe's brief contains one page of argument on this point that fails 
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to develop legal authority or explain its applicability. Lowe's offers a block quote of Rule 
52(b), followed by the conclusory assertion that Lowe's motion was timely. Lowe's 
argument then contains another paragraph that references Rule 60(b), but again contains no 
reasoned analysis-only conclusory statements that the Rule 60(b) motion was also timely. 
In short, Lowe's offers a conclusion, but fails to develop legal authority in any meaningful 
way. 
In addition to failing to develop any legal authority, Lowe's also fails to provide any 
meaningful analysis or application of authority to the facts and circumstances of the instant 
case. Lowe's simply asserts that its motion was timely. Lowe's fails, however, to offer any 
explanation of why this is allegedly the case, nor does Lowe's explain the significance of it's 
purportedly timely motion. Lowe's "dumped the burden of argument and research." For this 
reason alone, Lowe's argument on its motions for relief from summary judgment may be 
properly rejected. 
B. Lowe's Motion to Amend the Judgment was Properly Denied 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 
For the first time on appeal, Lowe's claims its motion to amend the order granting 
summary judgment should be granted pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Br. of Appellant at pp.20-21.) This argument must be disregarded for two 
reasons. First, Rule 52 was never raised by Lowe's before the district court. (R. 00806-816 
(raising Rules 54, 60, and 62 in motion to amend order granting summary judgment).) As 
a result, the district court never had an opportunity to rule on the applicability of Rule 52, and 
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Lowe's argument on this basis must be disregarded. Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (explaining that 
for an issue to be preserved for appeal, "[the] trial court must be offered an opportunity to 
rule on [the] issue"). 
Second, even if it had been preserved, Rule 52 is inapplicable to Lowe's request to 
modify a summary judgment order. Rule 52 deals with amendments to findings of fact made 
by the district court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (2005). The order at issue was an order granting 
summary judgment, made pursuant to Collins International's motion. The facts are 
undisputed on summary judgment. As a result, the district court made no findings of fact that 
could be amended or modified pursuant to Rule 52. In short, Rule 52 is inapplicable. See 
AMS Salt Indus.. Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America. 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997) 
(explaining that Rule 52 was inapplicable to summary judgment proceedings); Howard v. 
Howard. 601 P.2d 931, 934 (Utah 1979) (explaining that Rule 52 is inapplicable to orders 
pursuant to motion because no findings are required to support an order pursuant to motion). 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
Lowe's also claims the grant of summary judgment was improper pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules fo Civil Procedure because the district court failed to modify the 
order based upon "new evidence" discovered by Lowe's. (Br. of Appellant at p. 21.) Rule 
60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order based upon 
"newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." The district court properly denied Lowe's motion, and it 
therefore clearly did not abuse its discretion. Lowe's motion was not proper given the fact 
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that the "newly discovered" evidence was Lowe's own evidence that it should have disclosed 
during discovery but failed to do so, and the "newly discovered" evidence makes no 
difference in the final analysis. 
Rule 60(b) does not permit a party to avoid summary judgment based upon 
information that party had in its possession, custody, or control, but simply failed to disclose. 
See Gundotra v. United States Dept. of Internal Rev. Serv.. 2004 WL 2827965 (holding that 
party who failed to discover evidence in his own possession, custody, or control failed to 
exercise due diligence and was therefore not entitled to relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)), 
attached as Addendum D. Lowe's motion to amend was not based upon "newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
(2005). Lowe's "newly discovered" evidence consisted of Lowe's own documents. (R. 
01758, admitting to district court that Lowe's was "cognizant that the grounds on which it 
relie[d] include[d] recent production of its own internal documents.") Had Lowe's exercised 
due diligence, it would have discovered and disclosed its own documents. Accordingly, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lowe's motion to amend summary 
judgment based upon information Lowe's had in its possession, custody, or control, but 
simply failed to disclose. 
Lowe's assertions regarding Eagle documents should not change the analysis. Lowe's 
claims on appeal that "newly discovered evidence produced by Lowe's [regarding] the 
correct Eagle merger date surfaced within the time Lowe's was required to produce discovery 
on this point, and the delay was justified by the volume and disarray of the Eagle records 
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inherited by Lowe's in the merger." (Br. of Appellant at p.21.) In the district court, Lowe's 
insisted that it attempted to discover and disclose relevant "records and documents of Eagle 
Hardware... but the documents consisted of a mass in a state of disarray." (R 812.) Lowe's 
excuse is belied by the fact that Lowe's, as a party to the merger agreement, would have the 
same merger agreement documents available. In other words, just because the merger 
agreement and other relevant documents may not have been available in the Eagle documents 
does not mean that the same merger agreement and documents were unavailable in the 
Lowe's documents. The fact that Eagle's documents may or may not have been in disarray 
is no excuse for Lowe's not producing its own internal documents, documents that were not 
obtained from Eagle. 
Moreover, Rule 60(b) was not the proper vehicle for Lowe's to have sought additional 
time to conduct further discovery. Rule 56(f) permits a party to avoid summary judgment if 
the party needs to conduct further discovery. Lowe's never filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule56(f). Instead, Lowe's opposed the motion for summary judgment, then filed a motion 
to amend the order after summary judgment was granted based upon "newly discovered" 
information that was not newly discovered from other parties, but was Lowe's own internal 
information. 
Finally, the "newly discovered" documents are irrelevant because they do not change 
the result. Because Eagle's documents do not change the result, any problem obtaining them 
is irrelevant. Collins International explained this to the district court. (R. 1953, Mem. Opp'n 
to Mot. Relief Summ. J.)) The newly discovered documents include the 1996 contract 
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in Section I, Lowe's request for indemnity fails because the 1996 contract requires Collins 
International* •- indemnify Lowe's only for products that Collins International sold to 
Lowe s, and Low ins International did not sell the wheelbarrow to Low v Because this new 
e v U n u v v ^ h n l li i "mi mi f ir ami thr d r i i n I i -«-nil \\w \h 11«, <i< nn A the tin ihnii hi ii i m l l l n 
order. 
III. Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
A. Lowe's Failure to Adequately Brief Issue of Personal Jurisdiction 
courts do not address arguments that are not adequately briefed. Thomas. 961 P.2d at 304-
05. An adequately briefed argument contains a party's reasoning, supported by citations to 
tf le ai tit lorities, statutes and parts of the rerorH \.. ^.. -t(aj(9j(2005). 
If an argi lment fails include citation ' • : • 
courts are not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (internal quotations omitted). 
A . * - onaljurisdiction, 
this Court may properly reject Lowe's argument. Lowe's brief contains approximately six 
pages of material that appears to have been merely "cut" from an electronic legal research 
r
 The "newly discovered" evidence also includes an irrelevant September 2000 
"Master Standard Buying Agreement" between Lowe's and Collins Co. (R. 492-519.) 
This contract is irrelevant to summary judgment in favor of Collins International because 
Collins International was not a party to it. Moreover, Lowe's offers no argument based 
upon this contract in seeking to amend the order granting summary judgment. 
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tool and "pasted" into Lowe's brief. These six pages present nothing more than extensive 
block quotes from four sources: Utah Code Section 78-27-24 and three cases: State of Utah 
in re W.A. v. State of Utah, Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp.. and Phone Directories Co, 
Inc. v. Henderson. (See Br. of Appellant at pp. 22-27.) However, Lowe's fails to develop 
this legal authority in any way as required by Rule 24. 
In addition to failing to develop any legal authority, Lowe's also fails to provide any 
meaningful analysis or application of the authorities he quotes to the facts and circumstances 
of the instant case. The remaining paragraph of Lowe's brief on personal jurisdiction 
consists of assertions that personal jurisdiction is proper; and these assertions are not 
supported by any meaningful analysis. (Br. of Appellant at pp.27-28.) For the reasons 
outlined below, these assertions are without merit and have no basis in law. That said, 
Lowe's made these unfounded assertions without any reasoned analysis or application, and 
thereby "dumped the burden of argument and research." For this reason alone, Lowe's 
argument on personal jurisdiction may be properly rejected. 
B. The District Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction over Collins Co. of 
Taiwan 
1. Lowe's Bears the Burden of Establishing Personal Jurisdiction 
The party asking the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over another party bears 
the burden of establishing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. Fenn v. 
MLeads Enters.. Inc., 2004 UT App 412, <fll3, 103 P.3d 156; see also Haas v. A.M. King 
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Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (D. Utah 1998). Lowe's cannot satisfy its burden. 
2. General or Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
Utah law recognizes two types of personal jurisdiction: (1) general personal 
jurisdiction and (2) specific personal jurisdiction. Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at Tf 13,103 P.3d 
156; Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). 
Lowe's waived the issue of general personal jurisdiction and cannot meet its burden of 
establishing specific personal jurisdiction. 
a. No General Personal Jurisdiction 
Whether the district court had general personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. was not 
preserved for appeal. Lowe's failed to argue this issue to the district court and even clarified 
at the hearing that it was only alleging specific personal jurisdiction, not general personal 
jurisdiction. (R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3 (hearing transcript).). Because general personal 
jurisdiction was not raised before the district court, the issue was waived. See Badger. 966 
P.2d at 847. As a result, this Court need not address the issue of general personal 
jurisdiction. Fenn. 2004 UT App 412 at ^[13, 103 P.3d 156 (considering only issue of 
specific personal jurisdiction because general personal jurisdiction was not alleged).18 
18
 Even assuming this issue had been raised and preserved by Lowe's, the district 
court lacked general personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. "For [general personal 
jurisdiction] to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and continuous local 
activity in the forum state." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122. The continuous and systematic 
contacts with the forum state must also be such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
does not offend due process notions of fair play and substantial justice; these continuous 
and systematic contacts must be sufficient such that the defendant could reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court in Utah. Id. 
(continued...) 
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b. No Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
The district court determined it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. 
for the reasons argued by Collins Co. and based upon the undisputed affidavit of Nelson 
Shen that accompanied the motion. (R. 2168-71 (Minute Entry); R. 2178-79 (Order of 
Dismissal for Lack of Pers. Jurisd. "incorporating" the Minute Entry in its "entirety"); see 
also R. 1999-2002 (unsigned affidavit); R. 2011-14 (original signed affidavit).) The district 
court noted that general specific jurisdiction was not at issue, and then correctly determined 
that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. (R. 2169.) This was because 
the long arm statute provided no basis for personal jurisdiction, and because Lowe's failed 
to allege sufficient minimum contacts by Collins Co. within the state of Utah to satisfy due 
process. (R. 2169-70.) 
To analyze specific personal jurisdiction, the court must apply a two part test: (1) 
"assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant"; and 
(2) "assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." State in re W.A. v. D.A.. 2002 UT 127, f l4, 63 P.3d 607; 
ArgueilQ, 838 P.2d at 1122; cfi Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson. 2000 UT 64,112, 
8 P.3d 256. 
(...continued) 
Collins Co. had no contacts with the state of Utah, much less systematic and 
continuous contacts. (R. 1999-2002 (unsigned affidavit of Nelson Shen); R. 2011-14 
(original signed affidavit of Nelson Shen).) Because Collins Co. conducts no business 
activities in Utah whatsoever, the district court lacked general personal jurisdiction over 
Collins Co. Indeed, it would offend due process notions of fair play and substantial 
justice for a Utah court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a company like 
Collins Co. that does no business and has no contacts in Utah. 
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(1) Utah Long Arm Statute 
The Utah Long Arm statute is the starting point for assessing whether Utah law 
confers specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. "Specific personal jurisdiction gives 
a court power over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the particular 
activities of the defendant in the forum state." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122. For specific 
personal jurisdiction to attach, the defendant must have purposefully directed its activities 
at residents of the forum, and the litigation must have resulted from claims that arise out of 
or relate to those activities. See id. 
The long arm statute lists factors to consider in determining whether Lowe's claims 
against Collins Co. arose out of particular activities of Collins Co. in Utah and whether the 
litigation resulted from claims that relate to activities in which Collins Co. purposefully 
directed its activities at residents of Utah. Under none of these factors is it proper for Utah 
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. 
The Utah Long Arm Statute reads, in relevant part: 
Any person,... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself,... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising 
out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located 
within this state at the time of contracting; 
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(Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (2005). Analyzing subsection (1), Lowe's request for the 
district court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. is not founded upon 
any claim arising out of the transaction of any business within this state. As established by 
Mr. Shen, Collins Co. has no contacts within the state of Utah, conducts no advertising in the 
state of Utah, and conducts no business in the state of Utah. Under subsection (2), Lowe's 
claims do not arise out of a contract to supply services or goods in this state. Mr. Shen also 
established that Collins Co. did not contract to supply any goods or services in the state of 
Utah, and it conducted no business in the state of Utah. Under subsection (3), Lowe's claim 
does not arise out of the causing of any injury within this state by Collins Co. According to 
Mr. Shen's undisputed affidavit, Collins Co. does not manufacture goods, and it did not 
manufacture the wheelbarrow at issue. Moreover, Collins Co. did not inspect, possess, ship 
or receive any component part or assembled part for sale. Furthermore, Collins Co. could 
not have sold the wheelbarrow to Lowe's because, by Lowe's own admission in its motion 
for summary judgment, Lowe's "did not sell or distribute the subject product." (R. 1904). 
Under subsection (5), Lowe's claim does not arise out of a contract to insure any person, 
property, or risk located within the state at the time of contracting. Collins Co. did not enter 
into any kind of contract with Lowe's to insure risk in Utah. The October 1996 contract is 
between Lowe's and Collins International, the New Jersey Corporation, not Collins Co. 
Moreover, the September 2000 contract between Lowe's and Collins Co. was not executed 
in Utah, but is between a North Carolina corporation and a Taiwanese corporation, and it 
does not purport to insure any risk in Utah. 
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In sum, the Utah Long Arm statute, does not confer specific personal jurisdiction on 
Collins Co. 
(2) Specific Personal Jurisdiction over Collins Co would 
Offend Due Process 
Even assuming the Utah Long Arm Statute conferred specific personal jurisdiction 
on Collins Co., Lowe's cannot establish that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the 
district court would satisfy due process. To the contrary, it would have offended due process 
if the district court had exercised specific personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. 
It almost goes without saying that if the Utah Long Arm statute cannot be satisfied, 
it would offend due process to exercise jurisdiction over Collins Co. Notwithstanding, in 
order to satisfy due process, a foreign defendant's contacts with the state of Utah must be 
such that maintenance of a lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp.. 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) 
(citing, inter alia, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The 
foreign defendant's conduct and connection with Utah must also be such that the foreign 
defendant must reasonably anticipate being haled into court. Id (citing World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The foreign defendant must 
have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah. Id (citing 
Hanson v. Denkla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
Lowe's allegations against Collins Co. include claims of strict products liability (R. 
1680 (Am. Compl. ffl[6 & 7(a), (b), & (d)), and claims that Collins Co. owed contractual 
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duties to obtain insurance covering Lowe's and "to indemnify Lowe's." (R. 1680 (Am. 
Compl. f 7 (c) & (e).) Again, because the Utah Long Arm statute is not satisfied, it would 
necessarily offend due process to exercise jurisdiction over Collins Co. That said, the 
following reasons demonstrate why it would offend due process if Collins Co. were subjected 
to personal jurisdiction in a Utah in this case. 
First, Collins Co. cannot be subject to Lowe's products liability-based claims in Utah. 
The undisputed affidavit of Nelson Shen established that Collins Co. did not manufacture or 
distribute the wheelbarrow at issue or its component parts. Collins Co. cannot reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court in Utah, a jurisdiction in which it never purposefully availed 
itself of conducting activities, for a lawsuit involving a product that Collins did not 
manufacture or distribute. It would offend due process to subject a company that did not 
manufacture or distribute a product at issue in a strict products liability suit to jurisdiction in 
Utah.19 
19
 Even if Collins Co. were a manufacturer or distributor of the product, which it is 
not, Collins Co. would still not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah. This is 
because a foreign manufacturer or distributor cannot be subject to specific personal 
jurisdiction merely by placing a product into the stream of commerce. See Parry v. Ernst 
Home Center Corp.. 779 P.2d 659, 660-66 (Utah 1989). In Parry, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a Japanese manufacturer and Japanese wholesaler were not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Utah simply because they were in the chain of distribution of a 
product that ended up injuring a consumer in Utah. Id (discussing Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Court. 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). Furthermore, Lowe's expressly told the 
district court that it need not look to the stream of commerce theory for specific personal 
jurisdiction, and therefore the issue is waived. (R. 2190 at 8:5 to 9:3); Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
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Second, Collins Co. cannot be subjected to jurisdiction in Utah for Lowe's 
contractually-based claims. Lowe's never insisted that Collins Co. of Taiwan was a party to 
any relevant contract. Instead, Lowe's insisted that Collins International, the New Jersey 
"wholly owned subsidiary" of Collins Co., entered an "October 30, 1996 Master Standard 
Buying Agreement with Lowe's." (R. 2021 (Lowe's Opp'n to Mot. Dismiss at p.7, 113).)20 
At oral argument, Lowe's never explained how the purported breach of the 1996 contract by 
Collins Co. caused any kind of injury in Utah. (R. 2190 at p.l2:9 to 13:9.) It could not 
because the October 1996 Buying Agreement was between Collins International, the New 
Jersey Corporation, and Lowe's. (R. 520, 537.) Collins Co. was not a party to the contract 
and could not have breached it. 
Because Collins Co. was not a party to the 1996 contract, it cannot have breached the 
contract, and Lowe's cannot enforce the contract against it. It is axiomatic that a contract can 
only be enforced against a party to the contract; a contract cannot be enforced against a non-
party. See Shire Development v. Frontier Investments. 799 P.2d 221 222-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (holding that nonparty to contract lacked standing to enforce contract); Case v. Case. 
96 N.E. 440, 440-41 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1911) (stating that "[njothing is more settled . . . than 
that an instrument... cannot be enforced by or against one who is not a party to it," that it 
is "so elementary as to be axiomatic and needs no support in the citation of authorities," and 
20
 Throughout the discovery process, Lowe's never identified the contract. As a 
result, the district court permitted Lowe's to conduct discovery after summary judgment 
was entered in favor of Collins International to determine who manufactured the 
wheelbarrow. 
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holding that nonparty to a contract could not enforce it). Moreover, subsidiary corporations 
and parent corporations have their own separate legal identities and existence. Institutional 
Laundry v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 706 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Utah 1985). And a party to a 
contract with a subsidiary corporation cannot enforce the contract against the parent 
corporation. See, e.g.. Mitchell v. K.C. Stadium Concessions. Inc.. 865 S.W.2d 779,782-84, 
789 (Mo. Ct. Apps. 1993) (holding that party to lease agreement that had been assigned to 
subsidiary corporation could not enforce agreement against parent corporation).21 
Because Collins Co. and Collins International are separate legal entities, and because 
Collins Co. was not a party to the October 1996 Buying Agreement and cannot have 
breached it, the district court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. based 
upon the alleged breach of contract. Collins Co. cannot reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court for a suit involving a contract to which it was not a party. To do so would violate due 
process. Furthermore, as the district court had already determined on summary judgment, 
the 1996 contract had not, as a matter of law, been breached. The contractual obligations of 
indemnity had not been triggered by the Ervins' suit. 
21
 Additionally, Lowe's made no allegation to the district court or this court that 
Collins International was an agent or mere instrumentality of Collins Co. or that the 
corporate veil should be pierced. Any such allegation at this point would have to be 
disregarded as waived. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998). 
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C. Lowe's Purported Reasons for Personal Jurisdiction Have No Basis in the 
Law 
Lowe's purported reasons for jurisdiction in Utah are not supportable. Collins Co. 
addresses each contention below. As is noted previously, the arguments are difficult to 
decipher as they have not been properly presented or briefed.22 
Lowe's appears to argue that Utah courts have personal jurisdiction over Collins Co. 
because, according to Lowe's, Collins Co. should have foreseen that products it purportedly 
sold would reach consumers in the United States. This claim has no basis in the law or the 
undisputed facts. (See Br. of Appellant at p.28.) As a matter of law, just because a product 
sold by a foreign defendant corporation may or may not reach the United States of America 
does not empower any court within the United States to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the foreign defendant. The sole fact that a product is placed in the stream of commerce in 
the United States does not warrant jurisdiction in Utah or any other state. Parry, 779 P.2d at 
660-66. Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that Collins Co. never manufactured or distributed 
the wheelbarrow.23 
22
 Because Lowe's appears to argue only two points on appeal, any different 
arguments raised to the district court are waived. Badger. 966 P.2d at 847. 
Notwithstanding, the arguments to the district court are no different from those argued to 
this Court, and they lack merit for the same reasons. 
23
 As established in the Affidavit of Mr. Nelson Shen, Collins Co. of Taiwan's 
"only connection with Eagle Hardware regarding wheelbarrows was to refer Eagle 
Hardware to a manufacturer of wheelbarrows." (R. 2012, fflf 4, 7.) "At no time did 
Collins International [sic] in Taipei, Taiwan, manufacture, inspect, possess, ship, or 
receive for shipment any component part or assembled wheelbarrow for sale to Eagle 
Hardware or any other retail outlet." (R. 2012, ffl[ 4, 7.) 
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Lowe's also appears to claim that Utah courts have jurisdiction because Utah is a 
more convenient forum for Collins Co. than North Carolina because "Utah is closer to 
Taiwan." (See Br. of Appellant at p.29; R. 2031.) This has no basis in the law whatsoever. 
Lowe's asserts that Collins Co. signed a forum selection clause to submit to North Carolina 
court, but then makes the suggestion that Utah is a proper jurisdiction because it is closer to 
Taiwan than North Carolina. (Id.) This argument is completely without merit. To suggest 
that the geographical relation of the proposed forum to the defendant's corporate 
headquarters is the determinative factor for evaluating personal jurisdiction lacks any support 
in the law whatsoever. The fact that Lowe's points to a forum selection clause identifying 
North Carolina as the forum actually undermines Lowe's argument-it favors a finding of 
personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, not Utah.24 
24
 Despite the fact that Lowe's never identifies any relevant contract in its 
argument section or explains how it might be applicable, Lowe's mentions two contracts 
in its factual background section. These are the "newly discovered" but "never-before-
disclosed" contracts that were not timely produced in response to Collins International's 
motion for summary judgment: the October 1996 contract between Lowe's and Collins 
International, (R. 00492-19), and the September 2000 contract between a subsidiary of 
Lowe's and Collins Co. of Taiwan. (R. 00518-37.) The September 2000 contract with 
Collins Co. does not contain a consent to personal jurisdiction clause. This contract 
contains an arbitration clause, not a consent to personal jurisdiction clause, and this 
arbitration clause identifies North Carolina as the location for arbitration. (R. 00515-16 
(arbitration provision in September 2000 contract).) The October 1996 contract between 
Lowe's and Collins International contains a choice of law and consent to jurisdiction 
provision, identifying North Carolina, not Utah, as the applicable law and forum for 
disputes relating to that contract. (R.00533.) 
46 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court should be affirmed. 
First, this Court may properly dismiss Lowe's appeal for failure to comply with Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) because Lowe's dumps the burden of argument and 
research on the Court. The fact that Lowe's brief requires opposing counsel and this Court 
to decipher what Lowe's is trying to say demonstrates that Lowe's has dumped the burden 
of argument and research. This Court should not permit matters to be placed before it where 
a party fails to present reasoned argument. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
As to Lowe's first issue, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Collins International because Collins International owed no duties to Lowe's in tort or 
contract. Collins International did not manufacture or distribute the product and therefore 
cannot owe any duties in tort. Moreover, Collins International did not agree to indemnify 
Lowe's for products sold to Eagle long before Lowe's and Eagle merged. Collins 
International did not agree to indemnify Lowe's for liabilities Lowe's incurred by merger 
years after signing the indemnity agreement—liabilities owed by Eagle for products sold by 
Eagle. Collins International agreed to indemnify Lowe's for products Collins International 
sold to Lowe's, and the product at issue was not sold to Lowe's. 
Regarding the second issue, the motion to amend the order granting summary 
judgment to Collins International, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Lowe's did 
not produce any newly discovered evidence that should have been discovered through due 
diligence. Instead, Lowe's presented its own internal documents that it had failed to timely 
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disclose. Moreover, Lowe's own documents did not change the analysis by which Collins 
International was granted summary judgment. 
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Collins Co. of Taiwan for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to the undisputed affidavit accompanying the motion, Collins 
Co. had no contacts with the state of Utah whatsoever. Additionally, Lowe's waived any 
argument regarding general personal jurisdiction, and Lowe's purported reasons for specific 
personal jurisdiction have no basis in the law. 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN R. ERVIN and BLANCHE 
ERVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., a North 
Carolina Corporation, SHINFA, a Vietnamese 
Company and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., a North 
Carolina Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
COLLINS CO., LTD., JOHN DOES 1-X 
Third Party Defendants 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 010903973 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Before the Court is Lowe's Motion for Entry of Final and Appealable Judgment dated 
October 15, 2004. The Court having duly considered the same and having previously made its 
January 6, 2005 ruling now hereby makes and enters the final and appealable judgment in this 
case as follows: 
1. Lowe's Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment in Favor of Collins 
International Co., Ltd. under URCvP 52(b) and 60(b)(1), (2) and (6) dated May 23, 2003 is 
denied. 
2. All claims of Plaintiffs Ervin R. Ervin and Blanch Ervin are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice and upon the merits as provided by the Release, Settlement, and Indemnity 
Agreement executed by Plaintiffs and their attorney on June 6, 2003. 
3. The Court notes the following interlocutory orders which are now 
incorporated into this final judgment for purposes of appeal. 
(a) Summary Judgment filed June 19, 2003 dismissing with prejudice the Third Party 
Complaint of Lowe's Company, Inc. against Collins International Company, Ltd.. 
(b) Order of Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction filed January 22, 2004 
dismissing without prejudice Third Party Defendant Collins Co., Ltd.. 
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4. Pursuant to URCvP 54(b), and for purposes of appeal, the Court expressly 
directs entry of final judgment as to the matters mentioned above and expressly determines that 
there is not just reason for delay. 
SO ORDERED. 
4fe. DATED this day of > SCx^i CKsA^sj ,2005 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true .and correct^copy of the foregoing was served by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, this day of , 2005, on the following: 
Michael P. Zaccheo 
Brandon Hobbs 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main StreetPO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Robert B. Sykes 
Robert B. Sykes & Associates 
311 South State Street #240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
B 
CLIFFORD C. ROSS, #2802 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
200 South 505 East, 2d Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for Appellant, Defendant, and Third Party Plaintiff 
Lowe's Companies, Inc. 
05 FrR,, UUt(r 
CY "Y^riic:.. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN R. ERVIN and BLANCHE 
ERVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., a North 
Carolina Corporation, SHINFA, a Vietnamese 
Company and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., a North 
Carolina Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
COLLINS CO., LTD., 
COLLINS INTERNATIONAL CO, LTD, 
JOHN DOES 1-X 
Third Party Defendants 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No.: 010903973 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
1 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, and Appellant Lowe's 
Companies, Inc. (hereinafter "Lowe's) through counsel Clifford C. Ross of and for Dunn & 
Dunn, P.C. appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Final Judgment signed February 8, 2005 by 
the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City 
Department, State of Utah and filed February 8, 2005. 
Appellant also appeals from all interlocutory and intermediate judgments and orders in 
this action including the following: 
Lowe's appeals the Minute Entry and Order dated December 6, 2004 signed by 
Judge Peuler which denied Lowe's May 23, 2003 Motion for Relief From Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Collins International Co. Ltd. pursuant to U.R.Cv.P. 52(b) and 
(60)(b)(l)(2)and(3); 
Lowe's appeals the Order of Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction dated January 
21, 2004 signed by Judge Peuler and the related October 30, 2003 Minute Entry which 
dismissed without prejudice and for lack of jurisdiction all Lowe's claims against Third Party 
Defendant Collins Company, Ltd. and/ or against Third Party Defendant Collins International 
Company, Ltd. Lowe's also appeals all interlocutory orders and rulings upon which the 
above January 21, 2004 Order of Dismissal was based. 
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Lowe's appeals the Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2003 signed by Judge Peuler 
and the related September 30, 2002 Minute Entry which dismissed with prejudice and 
upon the merits all Lowe's claims against Third Party Defendant Collins International Co., Ltd. 
Lowe's appeals the January 17, 2003 Order referred to in the above June 19, 2003 
Summary Judgment. Lowe's also appeals all interlocutory orders upon which the above 
June 19, 2003 summary judgment was based. 
DATED this /(fi day 
CLIFF0RB-e:Rq>S 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Defendant Lowe's Companies, Inc. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by first class 
/A 
mail, postage prepaid, and also by fax as indicated below, this /Q, day of 
, 2005, upon the following: 
Michael P. Zaccheo 
Brandon Hobbs 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
and by fax 532-5506 
Robert B. Sykes 
Darren A. Davis 
Cory B. Mattson 
Robert B. Sykes & Associates 
311 South State Street #240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
C 
LOWE'S MASTER STANDARD BUYING AGREEMENT 
This Master Standard Buying Agreement by and between Lowe's Companies 
Inc. ("LOWE'S") a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business at 
Highway 268 East, North Wilkesboro, North Carolina 28659, LOWE'S HOME 
CENTERS, INC., a North Carolina corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. and THE CONTRACTOR YARD, INC., a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC. and such other wholly-
owned subsidiaries will separately and collectively be referred to as "LOWE'S" and the 
undersigned corporation and/or partnership, hereinafter known as "Vendor" by and 
through its authorized agent is hereby entered into this 30th day of 
October > 199&_. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Lowe's is in the business of operating stores for the sale of goods 
and/or services; and 
WHEREAS, the undersigned Vendor is a vendor of products and desires to sell 
products to Lowe's; and 
WHEREAS, every Lowe's Purchase Order, whether written, verbal or 
electronically communicated by Lowe's to said Vendor is subject to all terms and 
conditions contained herein, and shall apply to all purchases made by LOWE'S. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the terms and conditions stated herein 
and for good and valuable consideration receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by 
said Vendor, the parties agree to the following: 
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ARTICLE I. ACCEPT A NCV 
(1) Each Lowe's Purchase Order shall be deemed accepted by the Vendor 
according to the terms and conditions herein, if any shipment of merchandise is made. 
There can be no changes or alterations to the Lowe's Purchase Order unless consented to 
by an authorized agent of Lowe's Merchandising Department. 
(2) In case of conflict, this agreement supersedes any signed dealers 
Agreement. 
(3) This document establishes the minimum standards between Lowe's and 
the Vendor. The Lowe's Purchase Order is void unless given by an authorized agent of 
Lowe's. 
ARTICLE II. EDI & BARCOPING 
(1) Electronic Data Interchange "EDI" is a requirement for all vendors with 
more than 100 P.O.'s or invoices per year. 
(2) LOWE'S requires all vendors to have a scannable Universal Product 
Code "UPC" label affixed to products sold to Lowe's according to the Uniform Code 
Council's specifications. 
(3) All standard shipping containers (master cartons, bundles, pallets, inner 
packs, etc.) containing fixed multiples of the same item must have an Interleaved 2 of 5 
(UPC Shipping Container Code) placed on the packaging according to the Uniform 
Code Council's specifications. The model number and unit count contained within each 
level of packaging must be printed in human readable form. 
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(4) In the event Vendor fails to apply Vendor's scannabie UPC label or 
scannable Interleaved 2 of 5 codes; labeling product with incorrect UPC bar codes or 
Interleaved 2 of 5 codes; provides Lowe's with inaccurate UPC or Interleaved 2 of 5 
information; applies poor quality, nonscannable UPC label or Interleaved 2 of 5 codes; 
and/or substitutes merchandise without prior written notification of the new UPC codes 
or Interleaved 2 of 5 codes; then in that event, Vendor agrees and shall pay Lowe's a 
penalty for such violation in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per each 
violation. The payment of said penalty is in addition to any other damages that may be 
incurred as defined under Article VIII, Paragraph 2 of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE III. DELIVERY 
(1) LOWE'S preferred terms of sale are FOB Origin Freight Collect with all 
Vendor logistics costs netted out of the cost of goods unless otherwise agreed to in 
writing. LOWE'S further requires Vendor to provide three (3) additional pricing levels 
as follows: 
F.O.B. Origin, Freight Collect to LOWE'S Distribution Centers 
F.O.B. Destination, Freight Prepaid to LOWE'S Distribution Centers 
F.O.B. Destination, Freight Prepaid to LOWE'S Stores 
Vendor is required to provide pricing that adequately reflects and passes on to 
LOWE'S the savings Vendor incurs due to reduced administrative, labor, transportation, 
packaging costs and any other cost savings Vendor incurs due to the economies of scale 
provided by LOWE'S purchase orders. LOWE'S shall have the right to select any of 
the pricing option(s) described above as its terms of sale during the term of this 
Agreement, and LOWE'S reserves the right, at its option, to change from one pricing 
option to another, without limitation, if the Lowe's business so requires. 
(2) Regarding FOB Destination orders, no liability is incurred by LOWE'S 
and the risk of loss shall not pass to LOWE'S until legal title passes upon delivery of the 
merchandise to LOWE'S final destination(s), in good condition and accepted by 
LOWE'S. 
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(3) On all prepaid shipments to Lowe's Distribution Centers, Lowe's 
Vendor's carriers are required to schedule a delivery appointment with LOWE'S 
receiving location at least 24 hours in advance of shipment. All shipments to Lowe's 
stores require 24-hour notification to the Lowe's Receiving Department. LOWE'S will 
incur no additional charges resulting from extended unloading time for unscheduled 
deliveries. 
(4) If merchandise is purchased prepaid and add, all freight charges must be 
shown as a separate item on the invoice. The Vendor shall provide, upon request, a copy 
of the applicable freight bill for each invoice. 
(5) Vendor must advise LOWE'S immediately if any merchandise cannot be 
shipped or picked up in time to be received by the date(s) specified on the individual 
LOWE'S Purchase Order. Merchandise must not be shipped to arrive prior to the 
specified date unless consented to by an authorized agent of LOWE'S Merchandising 
Department. FOB origin shipments must have ship date. Freight prepaid shipments 
must have an arrival date. If merchandise is shipped or arrives on days other than those 
specified they are subject to penalty. Vendor warrants, covenants and agrees to ship all 
Purchase Orders timely and complete. 
(6) A detailed packing slip, including item number, the Lowe's Purchase 
Order number, store number, model number, quantity and shipper's name must 
accompany each shipment of merchandise. 
(7) All cartoning must be capable of withstanding the normal rigors of the 
transportation and physical distribution process. All master cartons must protect inner 
packs and individual sales units which will be displayed on LOWE'S sales floors. Any 
such concealed damage discovered upon receipt will be returned to the Vendor freight 
collect. 
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(8) LOWE'S requires unitization on all merchandise. The preferred method 
of unitization is through the use of pallets. All pallets must be 48"x40" hardwood with 
4-way forklift entry. All units must be stretch-wrapped prior to shipment. Any exception 
to LOWE'S unitization requirements must be approved in advance by LOWE'S 
Logistics Department. 
(9) Multiple orders on the same truck must be segregated. Identical items on 
each Lowe's Purchase Order must be unitized. 
(10) All transportation costs or expenses incurred by LOWE'S because of 
Vendor's noncompliance with the terms of an order, and any additional transportation or 
administrative charges due to split shipments, failure to follow LOWE'S routing 
instructions, errors in classification of merchandise, or for any other reason, shall be 
charged back to Vendor. 
(11) Vendor is responsible, at its cost, for insuring the merchandise to the 
F.O.B. point for full replacement value, including freight, and Vendor shall file all 
claims for loss or damage. All uncollectible portions of concealed damage claims will 
be charged back to Vendor. 
(12) No backorders will be accepted. 
(13) Accumulation of Less-than Truck Load "LTL" shipments is not allowed. 
Vendors/Carriers must adhere to the specified ship dates and arrival date per the 
designated routings. 
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ARTICLE IV. INVOICING/BILLING RFOfJIREMENTS 
(1) All invoice and/or credit memorandum transactions regarding 
merchandise purchased for resale should be mailed or electronically transmitted 
promptly and accurately to die specified address or Third Party Value Added Network 
mailbox. All billing related transactions that cannot be processed due to their failure to 
comply with LOWE'S billing requirements may be returned for re-billing or held for 
correction without the loss of applicable discounts. LOWE'S shall not be held liable for 
lost discount, interest and/or service charges related to the late payment of invoices 
which were delayed due to reasons beyond LOWE'S control. Vendors may be subject 
to an administrative processing charge for non-compliance. 
(2) All invoices, credit memorandums, bills of lading, related documents and 
other correspondence must reference LOWE'S Purchase Order Number or Assigned 
Control Number (Example: RMR #) and the specific LOWE'S store numbers) to which 
the transactions apply. In addition, Vendor must provide LOWE'S item numbers on 
invoices and packing slips as well as list line items in the same sequence as ordered. In 
lieu of requiring proof of shipment on all invoices, LOWE'S reserves the right to request 
proof of shipment or proof of delivery for selected transactions at a later date. 
(3) LOWE'S pays from invoice only. Vendor shall submit one invoice per 
Order (shipment) and one Order per invoice with no backorders being allowed by 
LOWE'S. Invoicing should be initiated on the day of shipment (not before) and 
reference the correct F.O.B. terms as well as the freight payment responsibility (collect 
or prepaid). LOWE'S reserves the right to charge back to the Vendor any shortages 
between merchandise received and merchandise invoiced . 
(4) Payment will be made in accordance with the terms mutually agreed 
upon in writing between the parties. Any deviation from the negotiated payment terms 
must be communicated and agreed to in writing by LOWE'S prior to invoicing. 
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Payment terms begin on the date of satisfactory receipt of all merchandise being 
invoiced, or receipt of a correctly completed invoice, whichever is later without loss of 
discount It will be LOWE'S policy to calculate an average transit time for each Vendor. 
The average transit days for a specific Vendor will be added to invoice/shipment date to 
determine the day on which dating is to begin. On all Prox. and E.O.M. (end of the 
month) dating, merchandise received after the 24th of any month shall be payable as if 
received on the 1st day of the following month. LOWE'S interprets payment due date as 
the day the remittance is to be mailed. 
(5) LOWE'S policy will be to include unit pricing on all outgoing EDI 
Lowe's Purchase Orders. Vendor agrees to notify LOWE'S of any price discrepancies 
prior to shipment/invoicing. Failure to communicate irregularities will result in a 
LOWE'S deduction which will not be refunded. Vendor further agrees that if prior to 
shipment there is any reduction in Vendor's regular selling price for the merchandise, 
the price specified on the Purchase Order will be reduced to the lower price. LOWE'S 
requires a minimum 60 days written notice for all price increases. A price increase 
cannot take effect until 30 days after LOWE'S authorized agent agrees (by letter) to 
accept. In addition, it is agreed that for price increases LOWE'S Purchase Order date 
determines applicable price and on price decrease invoice/shipment date determines 
applicable price. 
(6) If Vendor has a debit balance with LOWE'S, the amount owed will be 
deducted from the next remittance or a check from the Vendor to clear this amount will 
be paid within thirty (30) days at the option of LOWE'S. It is also agreed that LOWE'S 
has the option to perform post audits and file claims for billing/payment errors on prior 
years business transactions. These audits will normally be completed within 24 months 
of the end of a calendar year. 
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ARTICLE V. WARRANTIES & GUARANTEES 
(1) Vendor agrees that LOWE'S shall not be liable for the inspection of 
merchandise before resale and that all warranties expressed or implied, shall survive 
inspection, acceptance and payment by LOWE'S and LOWE'S customers. 
(2) Approval by LOWE'S of Vendor's design or materials shall not relieve 
Vendor from any obligations under any warranties, representations or guarantees. 
Merchandise delivered (whether paid for or not) are subject to inspection, testing and 
approval by LOWE'S before acceptance. Vendor warrants that the merchandise will be 
of good quality, material and workmanship, merchantable and free from any and all 
defects. 
(3) Vendor, by accepting the order, warrants, represents and guarantees that 
all applicable provisions of federal, state and local laws, ordinances, codes, rules and 
regulations have been fully complied with and that the price and other terms and 
conditions of sale, the terms on which all promotional and advertising matter are 
furnished by Vendor to LOWE'S and all guarantees, warranties, labels and instruction 
furnished in connection therewith comply with all such laws, ordinances, codes, rules 
and regulations. 
(4) Vendor, by accepting the Order, warrants, represents and guarantees 
their merchandise. Vendor agrees to provide LOWE'S with a signed guaranty form, if 
prescribed by the respective laws, ordinances, codes, rules or regulations as part of 
Vendor's invoice, before payment is required to be made under the terms of the Order, 
without loss of discount: that the weights, measures, signs, legends, words, particulars 
or descriptions (if any) stamped, printed or otherwise attached to the merchandise or 
containers or referring to the merchandise delivered hereunder are true and correct and 
comply with all applicable laws, ordinances, codes, rules and regulations; and that the 
merchandise delivered pursuant to the Order conforms and complies with the applicable 
LOWE'S 000196 
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provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act, Magnuson - Moss Warranty - Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act, Wool Products Labeling Act, Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetics Act, Federal Hazardous Substances Act, all other applicable laws, 
ordinances, codes, rules and regulations of any governmental agencies having 
jurisdiction and the standards of the Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. 
(5) With acknowledgment that the terms and conditions of this paragraph 
have been expressly bargained for and are an essential part of the Order, and in 
consideration of any and all purchases heretofore, herein and hereafter, made by 
LOWE'S from Vendor or from affiliates or subsidiaries of Vendor, and by accepting the 
Order, Vendor agrees to and shall indemnify LOWE'S, "LOWE'S" means collectively 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., its subsidiaries and affiliates, including but not limited 
to LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC., THE 
CONTRACTOR YARD, INC. and all employees, officers, directors and agents of 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC., THE 
CONTRACTOR YARD, INC. and their subsidiaries and affiliates and hold harmless 
LOWE'S from and against any and all liability and/or losses and/or damages, whether 
compensatory or punitive, which may be assessed against LOWE'S as is further set forth 
below. Vendor's obligation to indemnify and hold harmless LOWE'S shall include, but 
not be limited to, any and all claims, lawsuits, appeals, actions, assessments, product 
recalls, decrees, judgments, orders, investigations, civil penalties or demands of any 
kind, including court costs, expenses and attorney's fees, which may be made or brought 
against LOWE'S or third parties of said merchandise; any allegation of or actual mis-
representation or breach of warranty, expressed or implied, in fact or by law, with 
respect to the possession, purchase or use of said merchandise; any alleged bodily injury 
or property damage related to the possession or use of said merchandise; any alleged 
infringement claims of any patent, design, trade name, trademark, copyright or trade 
secret; any alleged violation by Vendor or any law ordinance code rule or regulation; 
any alleged or threatened discharge, release or escape of pollutants or other 
environmental impairment; or any breach or violation by Vendor of any terms or 
conditions of the Order. Vendor shall pay all judgments against and assume the defense 
within a reasonable time for any and all liability of LOWE'S with respect to any such 
matters, even if any such allegation of liability is groundless, false or fraudulent 
Notwithstanding the above, LOWE'S shall have the right but not the obligation to 
participate as it deems necessary in the handling, adjustment or defense of any such 
matter. Further, for the term of this Agreement and hereafter, Vendor releases Lowe's 
(and any of its subsidiaries or associated companies), from any claim based on Vendor's 
patent, copyright, trademark, trade dress or other intellectual property rights, Lowe's, at 
its sole discretion, shall have the right to purchase from other sources those products 
manufactured or offered by Vendor free of any patent, copyright, trademark, trade dress 
or other intellectual property rights of Vendor. 
Should Vendor fail to assume its obligations hereunder, to diligently pursue and 
pay for the defense of LOWE'S within a reasonable time, Vendor hereby agrees that 
LOWE'S shall have the right, but not the obligation, to proceed on LOWE'S own behalf 
to defend itself by way of engaging its own legal counsel and the services of any and all 
other experts or professionals it deems necessary to prepare and present a proper 
defense, and to thereafter require from Vendor reimbursement and indemnification for 
all costs and expenses incurred in such defense and for any and all penalties, judgments, 
fines, interest or other expenses to incurred as a result of such claim, lawsuit, appeal, 
action, assessment, civil penalty, product recall, decree judgments, orders or demands as 
more fully set forth above. 
(6) During the term of this Agreement and for a period of five (5) years after 
the date of termination, Vendor shall procure and maintain Products Liability and 
completed Operations Liability Insurance on an occurrence basis with limits of not less 
than $2,000,000 per occurrence and an annual aggregate of not less than $10,000,000 
for property damage, bodily injury or death to any number of persons, and other 
adequate insurance, which shall contain an endorsement by which the insurer extends 
the coverage thereunder to the extent necessary to include the contractual liability of 
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Vendor arising by reason of the indemnity provisions set forth herein. A broad form 
Vendor's endorsement shall be maintained in said insurance policy with LOWE'S and 
its wholly owned subsidiaries as an additional insured, requiring coverage for all other 
underlying and collectible insurance. Vendor further agrees to forward a copy of this 
Vendor Buying Agreement to its insurer, and as a condition precedent to LOWE'S 
obligation hereunder, to have delivered to LOWE'S by the Vendor's insurer a current 
certificate of insurance showing the coverage required by this provision. The insurance 
must be written by an insurance company with a minimum rating of Best's A-, Vlll or 
its equivalent, satisfactory to LOWE'S, and duly incorporated in the United States of 
America. Additionally Vendor and its insurer shall provide LOWE'S thirty (30) days 
prior written notice of non-renewal, cancellation or other change in Vendor's coverage 
which may impair or otherwise effect LOWE'S rights thereunder. 
(7) Vendor is a corporation and/or partnership duly organized, validly 
existing, and in good standing under the laws of the State in which it is either 
incorporated or filed; said Vendor has the requisite corporate power and/or authority 
and the legal right to enter into this Agreement, and to conduct its business as now 
conducted and hereafter contemplated to be conducted; and is in compliance with its 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws or its Partnership Agreement. The execution, 
delivery and performance of this Agreement and all instruments and documents to be 
delivered by Vendor are within the Vendor's corporate power and/or partnership 
agreement have been duly authorized by all necessary or proper action, including the 
consent of shareholders if required; do not and will not contravene any provisions of the 
Vendor's Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws and/or Partnership Agreement. This 
Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by Vendor, and constitutes the legal, 
valid, and binding obligation of the Vendor and enforceable against the Vendor in 
accordance with its terms. 
(8) Vendor acknowledges that Vendor and its officers, directors, employees 
and agents have received a copy of Lowe's Code of Ethics and Statement of Business 
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Ethics. Vendor along with its officers, directors, employees and agents hereby warrant, 
covenant and agree to perform in strict compliance with the Lowe's Code of Ethics, 
Lowe's Statement of Business Ethics, and all applicable laws. 
ARTICLE VI. MERCHANDISE RETURNS 
(1) Notice of defects in the merchandise or any other breach by Vendor 
under the terms of this Agreement and the individual Lowe's Purchase Order will be 
considered made within reasonable time, if made within a reasonable time after being 
discovered by LOWE'S or after notification is given to LOWE'S by its customers or the 
users of the merchandise. The return of such merchandise shall not relieve Vendor from 
liability for failure to ship conforming merchandise under the Lowe's Purchase Order or 
for liability with respect to warranties, expressed or implied. Failure of LOWE'S to state 
a particular defect upon rejection shall not preclude LOWE'S from relying on unstated 
defects to justify rejection or establish breach. Resale, repackaging, repacking or cutting 
up for the purpose of resale or for use shall not be considered as acceptance of the 
merchandise so as to bar LOWE'S right to reject such merchandise or to revoke 
acceptance. 
(2) Vendor agrees that in the absence of a negotiated and signed Defective 
Merchandise Return Policy, LOWE'S will adhere to the following general guidelines. 
Specifically, defective merchandise (item) with a value of under seventy-five dollars 
($75) will be destroyed by LOWE'S and if the value is over seventy-five dollars ($75), 
the merchandise (item) will be shipped back by LOWE'S freight collect without 
obtaining Vendor return authorization. Vendor further agrees to reimburse LOWE'S for 
the merchandise (item) at P.O. delivered cost. In addition, if the merchandise is shipped 
back on a prepaid freight basis, Vendor agrees to reimburse LOWE'S for the actual 
freight expense or fifteen percent (15%) of merchandise value, if the merchandise is 
returned via United Parcel Service. 
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ARTICLE VII. CANCELLATIONS & RETURNS 
(1) LOWE'S Merchandising Department reserves the right to refuse or return 
any Orders not shipped complete, as ordered and in accordance with the terms in this 
Agreement and the specifics as outlined in the Lowe's Purchase Order which includes 
the requested ship and arrival dates. 
(2) LOWE'S Merchandising Department reserves the right to cancel in 
whole or in part any Purchase Order at any time prior to the shipment of merchandise on 
the Purchase Order without incurring any liability. 
ARTICLE VIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
(1) Both parties acknowledge that this Standard Master Buying Agreement 
forms the Agreement. Performance of any Lowe's Purchase Order must be in 
accordance with all of the terms and conditions stated herein. There can be no changes 
or modifications to the Standard Master Buying Agreement, unless in writing and 
signed by a Vice President of LOWE'S Merchandising Department. In absence of any 
agreements signed by Vendor, this Agreement represents the entire agreement of die 
parties. 
(2) All costs, loss profits and expenses incurred by LOWE'S due to Vendor's 
violations of or failure to follow any or all of the terms of this Agreement will be 
charged back to Vendor and Vendor expressly agrees to reimburse LOWE'S for all such 
costs, loss profits and expenses. Vendor further agrees that LOWE'S may deduct such 
costs, loss profits and expenses from any sum thereafter owing to Vendor by LOWE'S 
under any Orders between LOWE'S and Vendor. 
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(3) Any and all taxes, fees, imposts or stamps required by State, Federal or 
Municipal Governments in the selling, transferring or transmitting of merchandise to 
LOWE'S shall be paid and assumed by Vendor. 
(4) No provisions of this Agreement shall be waived or shall be construed to 
be waived by LOWE'S unless such waiver is in writing and signed by an authorized 
agent of LOWE'S. No failure on the part of LOWE'S to exercise any of the rights and 
remedies granted hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by Vendor shall 
constitute a waiver of LOWE'S right to demand exact compliance with the terms hereof. 
The Vendor hereby waives use of the statute of frauds as a defense to any Order 
accepted pursuant to this Agreement. 
(5) The rights, remedies and options provided herein are in addition to and 
not to the exclusion of any and all other rights and remedies provided by law. 
(6) LOWE'S shall not be bound by any assignment of the Order by Vendor, 
unless LOWE'S has consented prior thereto in writing. LOWE'S may assign this Order 
to a present or future subsidiary or affiliate. 
(7) Should LOWE'S use the services of an attorney to enforce any of its 
rights hereunder, or to collect any amounts due, Vendor shall pay LOWE'S for all costs 
and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(8) This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the State of North Carolina. The parties agree that the courts within the State of 
North Carolina will have exclusive jurisdiction with venue being in Wilkes County, 
State of North Carolina. 
(9) Vendor agrees to furnish, when returning this completed Agreement, a 
complete set of current financial statements. Publicly held companies should include the 
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Annual Report to Shareholders and 10K Report. If financial statements are not 
available, a Dun & Bradstreet should be furnished. 
(10) The Vendor shall provide LOWE'S written notice of an assignment, 
factoring or other transfer of its right to receive payments arising under this Agreement 
30 days prior to such assignment, factoring or other transfer taking legal effect Such 
written notice shall include the name and address of assignee/transferee, date 
assignment is to begin, and terms of the assignment and shall be considered delivered 
upon receipt of such written notice by the Trade Payables Department. Vendor shall be 
allowed to have only one assignment, factoring or transfer legally effective at any one 
point in time. No multiple assignments, factoring or transfers by the Vendor shall be 
permitted. LOWE'S reserves the right to require any and all documentation in reference 
to the legal effect of the assignment, factoring or other transfer as determined needed by 
Lowe's Corporate Counsel prior to accepting the assignment, factoring or other transfer 
by LOWE'S. 
(11) Vendor shall indemnify LOWE'S against and hold LOWE'S harmless 
from any and all lawsuits, claims, actions, damages (including reasonable attorney fees, 
obligations, liabilities and liens) arising or imposed in connection with LOWE'S for 
amounts due and owing under this Agreement where Vendor has not complied with the 
notice requirements of this section. 
(12) Vendor, by accepting the order, warrants, represents and guarantees that 
all labor used by the Vendor and/or its Vendors or Suppliers is furnished by employees 
with a minimum age of no less than 16 years. Vendor acknowledges LOWE'S policy of 
purchasing products from Vendors who do not use child labor in the production of 
goods. 
(13) Vendor, by accepting the order, warrants, represents and guarantees that 
all labor in producing the goods by the Vendor and/or its Vendors or Suppliers is not 
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furnished, manufactured, produced, or distributed, wholly or in part by convicts or 
prisoners, except convicts or prisoners on parole, supervised release, or probation, or in 
any penal or reformatory institution. 
(14) Vendor, by and through its representative, further covenants and agrees 
not to communicate during the continuance of this agreement, or at any time 
subsequently, any information relating to the secrets, business methods, business 
secrets, including trade secrets, business information, and the corporation manner in 
which Lowe's conducts its business to any person, corporation or entity. Vendor 
acknowledges and agrees that Vendor has and will receive confidential information 
including, but not limited to: Proprietary packaging, proprietary produces) and/or 
product design(s), Lowe's business and confidential data which includes quotations, 
sales volume, pricing, etc. and that money damages will not adequately compensate 
Lowe's for any disclosure of any information in violation of this agreement Any right 
of equitable enforcement granted to Lowe's shall not be deemed to preclude Lowe's 
from seeking actual money damages or any other remedy from Vendor and/or its agents 
in the event of a breach of such covenant. 
Confidential information is not meant to include any information which, 
at the time of disclosure, is generally known by the public. 
(15) At any time during the term of this Agreement and for a period of five 
(5) years after the final payment of any invoice under this Agreement, Lowe's, or its 
designated agent, shall have the right to examine and audit up to five (5) years of the 
Vendor's records in respect to any and all matters occurring within the five (5) year 
period prior to the request and relating to Lowe's payments under this Agreement, 
including, but not limited to, payments for any orders, invoices, and Vendor's 
compliance with Lowe's business ethics policies and Lowe's Code of Ethics. Vendor 
shall maintain complete and accurate records to substantiate Vendor's charges, pursuant 
to this Agreement. By execution of this Agreement by Vendor, Lowe's shall have 
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access to such records for the
 Durpose rf a „ d j t durjng ^ ^ ^ 
reasonable notice to Vendor. 
(16) Th. initial a ™
 0 f this A g r e e m m t „ f M O M ( 1 ) ^ c o m m e n d n g ^ ^ 
date firs, written above and shaU automatically renewon a year-to-year basis thereafter 
unless terminated by written notice by either party no, later than sixty (60) days prior to' 
the end of the then current term. 
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FN WITNESS WHEREOF, LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. and the undersigned 
Vendor have hereunto set their hands as of the date of this Agreement. 
ATTEST: 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. 
BY:_ / S ^ V - 7 ^ ' £\ 
TITLE: 
Received and accepted: 
ATTEST: 
Collins International Co., Ltd. 
BY: 
A. G. Church, ^ 
7TTTF- Account Executive 
GMK Revised 9/30/96 
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H 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida. 
Paul K. GUNDOTRA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant. 
No. 00-7065-Civ-ALTONAGA. 
Oct. 14, 2004. 
Paul K. Gundotra, Coral Springs, FL, Plaintiff, pro 
se. 
Paul K. Gundotra, c/o G.N. Parkash, Faridabad 
HR, India, Plaintiff, pro se. 
Marcos Daniel Martinez, United States Attorney, 
Third Floor, Civil Division, Miami, FL, for 
Defendant. 
Mark Stier, Trial Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, 
DC, for Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
MOTION FOR A REHEARING 
ALTONAGA, J. 
*1 THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon 
Plaintiff, Paul K. Gundotra's Amended Motion for a 
Rehearing [sic] Additional Information Provided 
for the Issues Raised in the Order Dated 8/20/03 
[D.E. 32]. The Court heard oral argument on the 
Amended Motion on May 10, 2004 and has 
reviewed the parties' written submissions, pertinent 
portions of the record, and the applicable law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this motion, Mr. Gundotra seeks relief from this 
Court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the 
Defendant, United States Department of Internal 
Revenue Service (the "United States"), which the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 
Mr. Gundotra bases his motion on recently 
discovered information related to the true owner of 
real estate which was the subject of a federal tax 
lien. Because Mr. Gundotra fails to satisfy the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) for relief from a final judgment based on 
newly discovered evidence, and because the law of 
the case doctrine prevents Mr. Gundotra from 
re-litigating the issue of the real estate's ownership, 
Mr. Gundotra's motion is DENIED. 
n. BACKGROUND 
On July 28, 2000, Mr. Gundotra filed a civil action 
against the United States seeking return of 
$78,469.79, which Mr. Gundotra paid on behalf of 
PKG Foundation Corporation ("PKG") to settle 
PKG's 1990 income tax deficiency and release a 
federal tax lien on certain real property that PKG 
owned in Maryland. {See Compl. [D.E. 1] at 3-4, 
Ex. 1 at 2.) On April 17, 2001, the Court, in an 
order by Judge Ferguson, granted final judgment on 
the pleadings in favor of the Defendant. (D.E. 18.) 
The Court rejected Mr. Gundotra's argument that 
PKG had no beneficial interest in the Maryland real 
estate even though it held legal title to the property 
(which would have made the federal tax lien 
inappropriate). {Id. at 2-3.) The Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that 
"[t]he district court did not err in granting judgment 
on the pleadings, since both the relevant deed [to 
the Maryland real estate] and Closing Agreement 
executed by Gundotra [and the Internal Revenue 
Service] make clear the subject property was owned 
by PKG." Gundotra v. United States Dep't of 
Internal Revenue Serv., No.01-12761, [D.E. 23] 
slip op. at 4 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2002). The Eleventh 
Circuit stated that "[w]hen a taxpayer characterizes 
a transaction in a certain form, the Commissioner 
may bind the taxpayer to that form for tax 
purposes," and concluded that Mr. Gundotra was 
bound by the language contained in the deed and 
closing agreement that he had executed. Id. at 4-5 
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(citing Plante v. Comm'r, 168 F.3d 1279, 1280 
(1 lth Cir. 1999)). 
On August 12, 2002, after the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled in this case, Mr. Gundotra filed a Motion for a 
Rehearing with this Court alleging that on August 8, 
2002, "during filling [sic] away of the legal papers 
it was discovered that PKG Foundation which owed 
the said IRS taxes, did not own the properties that 
IRS had placed the lien on." (D.E. 22 at 1.) 
Although Mr. Gundotra previously argued in this 
Court and in the Eleventh Circuit that PKG did not 
own the Maryland real estate, his theory had now 
changed: Mr. Gundotra's new theory was that the 
Maryland real estate was not owned by PKG, a U.S. 
corporation, but rather by an entirely different 
corporation with the same name, "PKG Foundation 
Corporation," which was formed in the British 
Virgin Islands ("PKG-BVI"). (Id.) This Court 
dismissed Mr. Gundotra's Motion for a Rehearing 
on January 31, 2003 because "[n}o basis for 
exercise of jurisdiction [was} alleged and none 
appearfed] on the face of the pleadings." (D.E. 27 at 
1.) On February 7, 2003, Mr. Gundotra filed an 
Amended Motion for a Rehearing [sic] Statement of 
Jurisdiction Added [D.E. 28] in an attempt to cure 
the infirmity with his August 12, 2002 motion. 
[FN1] 
FN1. Mr. Gundotra failed to explain in his 
February 7, 2003 Amended Motion why 
this Court, and not the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, would have 
jurisdiction over this case following an 
appeal. Mr. Gundotra instead cited 26 
U.S.C. § 7426(a)(4), which gives this 
Court jurisdiction over Mr. Gundotra's 
original cause of action. 
*2 This Court denied Mr. Gundotra's Amended 
Motion on August 20, 2003, noting that Mr. 
Gundotra had "once again failfed] to allege a basis 
for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction." (D.E. 
30 at 1 .) The Court also concluded that Mr. 
Gundotra was "not entitled to reconsideration of the 
judgment in this case based on newly discovered 
evidence" because his "initial motion for a 
rehearing was filed on August 12, 2002, more than 
one year after entry of the judgment on the 
pleadings on April 17, 2001." [FN2] (Id at 2.) 
Finally, the Court concluded that Mr. Gundotra's 
proffered evidence did not "conclusively show that 
the PKG Foundation Corp. in question was a British 
Virgin Islands Corporation [sic] and was not the 
same company that owed taxes in the United 
States." (D.E. 30 at 2.) The Court therefore ruled 
that Mr. Gundotra was "not entitled to a 
reconsideration of the judgment for 'any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment."' (Id.) 
FN2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
requires a party to make a motion for 
relief from a final judgment based on 
newly discovered evidence within one year 
after the judgment was entered. 
Mr. Gundotra now moves the Court for the third 
time seeking relief from the April 17, 2001 final 
judgment. Mr. Gundotra's current motion puts forth 
essentially the same argument that he presented in 
his August 12, 2002 Motion for a Rehearing [D.E. 
22]-that PKG-BVI, not PKG, owned the Maryland 
real estate which was the subject of the federal tax 
lien~and adds as an exhibit PKG-BVTs Certificate 
of Incorporation showing that the entity was 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on April 
17, 1990. (D.E. 32 Ex. 3) Mr. Gundotra's legal 
argument rests on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Johnson 
Waste Materials v. Marshall, 611 F.2d 593 (5th 
Cir. 1980), [FN3} to support his claim for relief 
based on newly discovered evidence despite the fact 
that he filed his motion more than one year after 
entry of judgment. 
FN3. Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 
issued before October 1, 1981 are binding 
as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. 
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 
1206,1207 (1 lth Cir.1981) (en banc). 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
A court may relieve a party from a final judgment 
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because of "newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). A motion for relief under 
Rule 60(b)(2) must be made within a reasonable 
time and "not more than one year after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken." Id. 60(b). Rule 60(b), however, "does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment." Id. For example, in Johnson Waste 
Materials, the court "properly consider [ed] 
defendants' independent action for reformation on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, even 
though such action was brought more than one year 
after judgment." 611 F.2d at 597. 
Aware that this Court has previously ruled that his 
motion is untimely (D.E. 30 at 2), Mr. Gundotra 
nevertheless asks this Court for relief by citing 
Johnson Waste Materials (D.E. 32 at 2). 
Apparently, Mr. Gundotra wishes the Court to rule 
on his motion for relief as though it were an 
independent action seeking to reform or set aside 
the judgment. Such an action is an "extraordinary" 
remedy, though, and the party seeking relief bears a 
"heavy burden" to show that the strict requirements 
of Rule 60(b)(2) have been met. Johnson Waste 
Materials, 611 F.2d at 597-98. To prevail, Mr. 
Gundotra would have to show the following: 
*3 that the evidence was discovered following the 
trial, that he used due diligence to discover the 
evidence at the time of the trial, that the evidence 
is not merely cumulative or impeaching, that it is 
material, and that a new trial in which the 
evidence was introduced would probably produce 
a different result. 
Id. at 597 (citing Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida, 512 
F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Ledet v. United 
States, 297 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.l962». 
Mr. Gundotra fails to satisfy the legal standard set 
forth above. Specifically, Mr. Gundotra failed to 
exercise due diligence in discovering the evidence 
related to PKG-BVI at the time the Court issued its 
April 17, 2001 judgment on the pleadings. Mr. 
Gundotra admits that he had the PKG-BVI evidence 
in his possession while this case was proceeding but 
only noticed it while filing papers away related to 
the case. (D.E. 22 at 1.) Mr. Gundotra further 
explained in his oral argument that he was aware of 
the formation and existence of PKG and PKG-BVI 
but that PKG-BVTs relevance to the Maryland real 
estate had slipped his mind due to the passage of 
time. These factors indicate that Mr. Gundotra 
failed to make a thorough search for evidence in his 
own possession related to the true owner of the 
Maryland real estate, even though this was the 
central issue litigated in this Court and in the 
Eleventh Circuit. Because Mr. Gundotra failed to 
exercise due diligence in discovering the PKG-BVI 
evidence, his motion for relief under Rule 60(bX2) 
would be denied even if he had filed it on time and 
even if he had filed it as an independent action 
seeking to set aside the judgment. 
B. The Law of the Case 
In addition to falling short of the due diligence 
requirements of Rule 60(b), Mr. Gundotra's motion 
for relief is also denied under the "law of the case" 
doctrine. "As most commonly defined, the doctrine 
posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, 
that decision should continue to govern the same 
issues in subsequent stages in the same case." 
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). 
"This rule of practice promotes the finality and 
efficiency of die judicial process by protecting 
against the agitation of settled issues." Christianson 
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
former Fifth Circuit described the law of the case 
doctrine as follows: 
[A] decision of a legal issue or issues by an 
appellate court establishes the "law of the case" 
and must be followed in all subsequent 
proceedings in the same case in the trial court or 
on a later appeal in the appellate court, unless the 
evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially 
different, controlling authority has since made a 
contrary decision of the law applicable to such 
issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and 
would work a manifest injustice. 
White v. Murtha, 111 F.2d 428, 431-432 (5th 
Cir.1967). 
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authority and does not argue that the Eleventh 
Circuit's conclusion that PKG owned the Maryland 
real estate was clearly erroneous. Instead, Mr. 
Gundotra argues that the PKG-BVI evidence is 
substantially different from the evidence that he 
presented to this Court and the Eleventh Circuit 
when he originally argued that PKG did not own the 
Maryland real estate. Changing his theory of the 
case, however, does not permit Mr. Gundotra to 
avoid the law of the case doctrine and re-litigate an 
issue that has already been decided by this Court 
and affirmed by the court of appeals. For example, 
in Baumer v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit 
applied the law of the case doctrine and refused to 
allow taxpayers on remand to introduce certain 
expert opinion evidence when "the taxpayers made 
a deliberate tactical decision in the first trial not to 
introduce [the] evidence" and "[t]here [was] nothing 
in the record to indicate that the evidence ... was 
unavailable to the taxpayers during the first trial." 
685 F .2d 131&, 1321 (11th Cir.1982). 
In this case, Mr. Gundotra does not appear to have 
made a deliberate tactical decision to conceal the 
existence of PKG-BVI when he first litigated the 
issue of whether PKG owned the Maryland real 
estate; rather, he stated that PKG-BVI's existence 
slipped his mind. Nevertheless, the PKG-BVI 
evidence was in Mr. Gundotra's possession all 
along, and with due diligence, he would have been 
able to proceed on his current theory the first time 
he litigated the issue. Because this Court and the 
Eleventh Circuit have previously ruled that PKG 
owned the Maryland real estate for tax purposes, the 
law of the case doctrine prohibits Mr. Gundotra 
from changing his theory and relitigating the issue 
by presenting evidence that was in his possession 
the first time around. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, it is 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff, Paul 
K. Gundotra's Amended Motion for a Rehearing 
Additional Information Provided for the Issues 
Raised in the Order Dated 8/20/03 [D.E. 32] is 
DENIED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to mark 
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this case CLOSED, and all pending motions are 
DENIED as moot. 
DONE AND ORDERED. 
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